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This thesis compares two cases of European democracy and security to explain
why the Czech Republic was invited to join NATO and why Slovakia was excluded
from the Euro-Atlantic integration. This thesis further discusses the political and
economic character of Slovakia and the proposed reforms of Slovak policy to join
NATO and the European Union in the near future.
When Czechoslovakia split into two independent states, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, on January 1, 1993, both were believed to have a good chance of integrating
into the West's political and military organizations at the earliest opportunity. While
the Czech Republic forged ahead with democratic and free market reforms and
successfully completed NATO accession talks, Slovakia failed to achieve these
important objectives. Because of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's anti-
democratic statecraft, Slovakia has lately been excluded from the enlargement process.
This policy led Slovakia slowly and non-democratically toward an authoritarian regime
and dictatorship.
However, the 1998 September Parliamentary elections have changed the
political face of Slovakia and the new Prime Minister, Mikulas Dzurinda's government,
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This thesis, Democracy and Security in Central Europe: A Comparison of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia in NATO Enlargement, examines the rebirth of democracy
in these nations after their separation on January 1, 1993. This thesis also traces their
transition from post-Communist regimes to democratic regimes, and their path from the
Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (WPTO) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
Initially, this thesis details the common historical background of Czechs and
Slovaks and examines the causes for Czechoslovakia dissolution into the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. This thesis then suggests that persisting nationalistic tendencies
and misconceived economic reforms prompted by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir
Meciar led Slovakia by 1995/1995 to dictatorship, political failure, and the nation's
exclusion from Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The Czech-Slovak separation resulted not only because of historical and
economic differences between the two nations, but also for two other primary reasons:
a) The Czech Republic made vast, sweeping, and rapid economic reforms, including a
great privatization process. Such changes were highly attractive to NATO and other
alliances. While as the same time, the Czech republic avoided the democratic
piteous that emerged in Slovakia.
b) ' The Slovak leader, Meciar, called for more government autonomy, a slowing of both
privatization and economic reforms, while he undermined the establishment of
democratic principles in their nation. Such quasi-dictatorial leadership excluded
Slovakia from NATO and the European Union (EU).
XI
To explore this subject, this thesis employs and adopts three primary theories as
espoused by the authors of three outstandingly perceptive works on this subject: first,
the theory of the systematic comparative analysis of the process of democratic
consolidation in post-Communist Europe, as detailed in Juan J. Linz and Alfred
Stepan's book, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; second, the
theory of the "triple transition" (democratization, marketization, and a national
transformation) in Czechoslovakia's post-Communist period that has determined the
dynamics between the state and nation, as presented in Carol Skalnik Leff s book, The
Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State; finally, the theory of the "effective"
democratic civilian control of the military in Jeffrey Simon's book, NATO Enlargement
& Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations.
The introductory chapter of this thesis mainly discusses all the issues regarding
the Czech Republic and Slovakia's transitions to democracy and their route to NATO.
The second chapter chronicles nearly three decades of Czechoslovakia's historical
background until it culminated in independent Czech-Slovak statehoods. Such
historical knowledge is essential to this study. This is true, for to compare the Czech
Republic and Slovakia in their transition to democracy and to compare their two widely
different paths toward democratic consolidation and NATO integration after the
Communist collapse, we must understand their social, cultural, and economic
differences.
The third chapter combines all of the three above mentioned state transition
theories and analyzes Czechoslovakia's return to democracy after almost forty-one
xn
years. Examining two different transition paths to democracy. I argue that while the
Czech Republic seems to be a healthy, competitive, fully-functioning democracy.
Slovakia with Prime Minister Meciar's governing style, does not.
The fourth chapter mainly discusses the chronological events of NATO
enlargement and the pros and cons, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia's effort
for NATO membership. Again, while the Czech Republic "has served as a political role
model for Central and Eastern Europe." 1 Slovakia as one among the first potencial "hot"
candidates of the so called "Visegrad Group," was excluded from NATO and the EU
because they did not meet the minimal requirements for early NATO membership.
Finally, in the case of Slovakia and its reaction to a general exclusion from Euro-
Atlantic integration owing to anti-democratic policies, the fifth chapter discusses the
political and economic impact on Slovakia and the nation's proposed policy reforms to
join NATO and the EU in the near future.
Quite clearly, Slovakia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions interests and
and benefits all Central European countries. All Visegrad countries underestand and
concede that if Slovakia becomes a part of the same institutions more military security
and political and economic stability will be established in the whole region, and perhaps
even worldwide. 2
Franklin D. Kramer, "Franklin D. Kramer, "Prepared Statement of Franklin D. Kramer...." Federal News Service,
23 October 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [15 April 1998], p. 3.
2
"Stredoeuropskf prezidenti podporuju Slovensko (Central-Eropean's Presidents Support Slovakia)." 13 October




First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife Lenka for her understanding
and great support. Without this loving woman who is now carrying our first child, I
would never have completed this thesis. I am greatly indebted to the advice,
suggestions and the guidance of Professor Donald Abenheim. To Professor Thomas C.
Bruneau and Lecturer Bertrand M. Patenaude, my sincere appreciation for helping me
understand some of the historical facts and issue related to this thesis.
In addition, I would like to thank Professor Maria Jose Moyano Rasmussen who
encouraged me to inquire into this subject. And finally, I would like to thank Ron
Russell for suggestions, tireless effort, and patience in editing my work, I could not have




In the last ten years, no part of the world has changed more radically than Central
and Eastern Europe. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, authors of Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation, the first book that grounded post-Communist Europe
within the literature of democratic theory in comparative politics, noted, "Where there
were nine states in 1989, there are now twenty-seven, fifteen of them successor states of
the USSR." 3 Many of these new countries have emerged without knowing a democratic
tradition. Certainly, all these new states have appeared amid profound changes in their
economies, political systems, and societies. The transition of these countries to new
political systems has created many new opportunities but has also led to new instability
and uncertainties.
In the case of the successor states to the former Czechoslovakia, this study
analyzes the interaction of the European states, democratic consolidation, and domestic
politics in the enlargement of Atlantic security and the defense institutions, such as
NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Cooperation and
Security in Europe (OSCE), into central Europe. In this connection, the striking manner
in which certain central European states, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and
Hungary, have succeeded in their quest to join NATO, while the Slovak Republic
3 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Post-Communist Europe: The Most Complex Paths and Tasks," Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 232.
(Slovakia), Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria have failed to do so, cries out for scholarly
analysis.
Further, as of this writing, NATO remains open to new members, so an
understanding of the cause and effect of successful or unsuccessful integration of NATO
has especially great interest to makers of policy. In this spirit, the author, who has
witnessed and participated in the effort of the Czech Republic to join NATO, has
undertaken a comparison of Czech and Slovak policy regarding the NATO enlargement.
Ten years ago, nobody could have predicted that the former Soviet allies and the
former Warsaw Pact nations the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland would be invited
into the NATO military alliance. Yet now NATO's receptive policy has led to its
expansion right up to the western frontiers of the former Soviet Union. In the early
1990s, three Central-European countries were supposed to join NATO: Czechoslovakia
(which was divided into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in 1993),
Poland, and Hungary in the early 1990s. However, Slovakia with its controversial Prime
Minister, Vladimir Meciar, and Chairman of HZDS ("Movement for Democratic
Slovakia"), began to fall behind the other countries' movements toward democracy
mainly because of many disruptions in the democratization process.
After Slovakia achieved its independence at the start of 1993, it went through
several political problems and government crises from 1995 through 1998, and especially
in the middle of 1998, that slowed or perhaps completely halted the inception of
democracy in the country. These disruptions were attributable to a) the authoritarian style
of Meciar's leadership, b) the Referendum on Slovakia's non-entrance into NATO and
the non-direct election of the President on May 23 and 24, 1997, that was craftily
undermined by the government. Many other government anti-democratic activities, such
as Prime Minister Meciar's attempts to censor the media, to restrict minority opposition
parties, and to politicize the Slovak Armed Forces prior to the last Slovak election in
September 1998, definitely moved Slovakia away from the first wave of NATO
enlargement. These anti-democratic policies of Prime Minister Meciar also isolated
Slovakia from the other post-Communist Central and Eastern European countries.
Furthermore, soon after the separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Slovakia distinguished
itself from its Czech neighbor in entirely negative ways, missing the first step toward
NATO and the EU and souring its relationship with the leaders of the two organizations
by blaming the "EU and NATO exclusion on ignorance... without adequate knowledge
about Slovakia."4
While some could argue that both the Czech Republic and Slovakia were good
candidates to join NATO from 1993 to 1995, NATO's Madrid Summit, two years later,
excluded Slovakia and other Eastern European countries and invited only three countries,
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The US Ambassador in Slovakia, Ralph
Johnson, clearly stated in his speech on July 14, 1997, why the United States could not
support Slovakia's entry into NATO in its first wave of enlargement. According to this
speech, Slovakia was excluded mainly because of its disturbing anti-democratic
4
"Slovakia Blames EU, NATO Exclusion on Ignorance," 17 July 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/news/98071703.html> [30 July 1998], p. 1.
developments. These problems can be divided into the three following areas: a) the
intolerant and unfair treatment of those with politically opposing points of view b) the
increasing centralization of power, and c) the misuse of state institutions.5
Presently, for Slovakia and other excluded countries, NATO is assembling a
package of measures aimed at reassuring them that the newly-established Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) will strengthen political consultations and military
cooperation. Such a program will also enhance the role of Partnership for Peace (PfP) or
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help Slovakia and
other countries meet the standard requirements for another wave of NATO enlargement
when they are prepared to join.
From 1996 to 1998, there has been much discussion in the US and Europe over
NATO enlargement. The above-mentioned measures are intended to promote democracy
and stability in Central and Eastern Europe. By supporting and encouraging Slovakia's
effort to move toward a stable democracy and market economy, the Western democracies
and other Central European countries can help Slovakia achieve its important objectives—
the top Slovak foreign policy priority—of joining the emerging transatlantic security
architecture. Indeed, supporting these new democracies in Eastern Europe will bring
more security and stability to the region. In keeping with NATO policy, "NATO's door
5 Ralph Johnson, "Door to NATO Will Open to Slovakia in Future." Amb. Johnson Remarks 7/14 On U.S. -Slovakia
Relations. 16 July 1997. Available [Online]: <http://pes.eunet.cz/97/29/0029arl7.htm> [26 May 1998], p. 3.
remains open"6 to those European countries, which, naturally, meet NATO requirements.
Also, from the point of view of the Czech Republic and most other Central and European
countries, regarding national security interest, it is essential that Slovakia become a_
member of the same Euro-Atlantic and European institutions. This is true because as
soon as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary enter NATO and the EU, they will be
obliged to strengthen their political and economic borders against Slovakia. Such borders
may draw another new dividing line in Europe. Moreover, having Slovakia in the same
Euro-Atlantic and European institutions is even more important in the midst of the
Russian economic collapse because such economic influences can spread beyond Russian
boundaries and can negatively impact Slovakia.
Prime Minister Meciar's May 1998 visit to Russia prior to Slovakia's September
1998 elections, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin told Meciar, "We hope, we really
hope so much that it will be you who will win the election. The mutual relationship
between our countries is excellent and it would be a pity to change anything," vividly
demonstrated Russia's persistent interest in the region. 7
It is important to stress that NATO will keep its door open because the continuing
process of NATO enlargement will preclude new dividing lines being formed in Europe
between those countries that were invited to join NATO and those that were not, as was
" Javier Solaria, "NATO and European Security into the 21 st Century," Speech by Dr. Javier Solatia, Secretary-
General ofNATO to the Oxford University Union Society. 13 May 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.slovakemb.com/foreign.shtmJ> [26 June 1998], p. 4.
Karel Wolf, "Moskva Jasne naznacila. ze drzi palce Meciarovi (Moscow Clearly Indicated That They Were Crossing
Their Fingers for Meciar)." Dnes, 29 May 1998, p. 1 1.
the case with Slovakia, or those, such as, Slovenia and Romania, which continue to work
hard to join NATO.
This thesis examines the pros and cons of Slovakia's entry into NATO. The
thesis also compares and analyzes two particular cases to explain why the Czech Republic
was invited to join NATO while Slovakia was excluded from the Euro-Atlantic
integration. In the case of the Czech Republic, the pros and cons of alliance accession
have emerged as NATO membership must be the case in a democratic polity. The Czech
Republic is convinced that it is more effective and economical to guarantee security when
it cooperates with others. Finally, in the case of Slovakia and its reaction to a general
exclusion from Euro-Atlantic integration because of its anti-democratic policies, this
thesis will discuss the political and economic impact on Slovakia and the proposed
reforms of Slovak policy to join NATO and the EU in the near future. Regarding these
issues, this thesis also analyzes the debates among international political elites, as well as
public opinion.
For Slovakia, integration into the Western structures, NATO, and the Western and
European Union has been an essential post-Cold War foreign policy. Slovakia considers
NATO as the most effective security structure in Europe and has expressed a strong
interest in NATO membership. Former Slovak President Michal Kovac, during his
second visit to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on October 17, 1996, stated:
I would like to emphasize that the Slovak Republic shares the same values
that are recognized by developed democratic states-the member countries
of the Alliance.... Therefore the primary effort of the Slovak Republic is
the striving to join the transatlantic community of democratic, stable, and
prosperous countries... and I believe [the Slovak Republic] will continue to
take all necessary steps leading to the gaining of our full membership in
the alliance in the first wave of its enlargement. ... We know about several
of our problems which will call forth certain doubts about our further
direction. These questions are the subject of discussion, polemics, and
hard criticism. We regard them as a temporary phenomenon. They are
solvable in a constitutional and democratic way.8
Only six months after he gave this speech, Slovak President Kovac made a crucial
mistake and allowed one nationwide referendum on the direct elections of the President
(one ticket with one question about the President elections) and another referendum on
the entrance of the Slovak Republic to NATO (one ticket with three questions about
NATO) at the same time. On March 13, 1997, the Slovak President announced the
referendum for the May 23 and 24, 1997, with one ticket on which all four questions were
combined. Total chaos came over the country when the Minister of the Interior cancelled
a distribution of the tickets with four questions and ordered the printing and distribution
of the tickets with three questions, which was illegal. 9 The failure of the Slovak
government policy to follow constitutional laws in the referendum was considered a
monumental problem of both Slovak politics and leadership. This anti-democratic
centralization of power finally excluded Slovakia from NATO and the EU in 1997.
8
.Michal Kovac. "Address By H.E. Michal Kovac. President of the Slovak Republic." 17 October 1996. Available
[Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961017a.htm> [30 August 1998], pp. 1-5.
9 Miroslav Sedivy, "Referendum in Slovakia (23 rd - 24lh May 1997)," 19-26 May 1997. Available [Online]:
<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7502/referend.html> [25 August 1998], pp. 1-5.
However, the September 1998 Slovak Parliamentary elections clearly showed the
Slovak public's disagreement with such a government policy that slowly and non-
democratically led the country toward a dictatorship. Slovak citizens, calling for
extensive political changes and an improvement in the Slovak reputation among the
Western democracies, voted for reestablishing democratic principles in the country once
again and took another fundamental step in Slovak history. "It's a new epoch, a new
start.... Slovakia will show Europe and the world a new face," declared Mikulas
Dzurinda, chairmen of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and, later, new Slovak
Prime Minister, immediately after the elections. 10
10 Siegfried Mortkowitz, "Slovakia's Democratic Revolution." 30 September. Available [Online]
<http://www.praguepost.cz/archive/news93098a.html> [30 November 1998], pp. 1-2.
II. HISTORICAL BACKROUND - THE END OF CZECHOSLOVAK
STATEHOOD
Once a nation is constituted, its people start to feel the necessity of its
statehood, and this naturally applies to the Czechs and Slovaks as well.
Due to their historical development, the theoretical and philosophical
bases for Czech and Slovak statehood differed. n - Jan Rychlik
An understanding of Czech and Slovak history involves both their efforts to build
their nations and their place in the international security system. Such knowledge of the
past is essential to this analysis.
To compare the Czech Republic and Slovakia in their transitions to democracy
and to compare their two widely different paths toward democratic consolidation and
NATO integration after the Communist collapse, we must examine the historical
background of these two newly-founded republics to better understand their social,
cultural, and economic differences.
Thus the first three sections of this chapter will provide a brief historical summary
of Czechoslovakia, and of both the Czech Republic and Slovak "exceptionalism." 12 This
historical overview will be divided into three sections. The first will cover the post-
World War I period, and the second section will examine the post-World War II period.
1
' Jan Rychlik. "National Consciousness and the Common State (A Historical-Ethnological Analysis)." in Jifi Musil
ed.. The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 99.
'•" Kusy uses the term "Exceptionalism" to indicate several stereotypes of the Slovak's position in the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic to point out the Slovak's differences from the Czechs. See Miroslav Kusy, "Slovak
Exceptionalism." in Jifi Musil. ed.. The End of Czechoslovakia (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995),
p. 139.
The third and final section will examine the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia
and the end of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
The study of contemporary history gives us not only knowledge about world
politics and societies, but it also enlightens us about the evolution of societies and the
militaries. Such a study can help us analyze and even to predict, in some way, further
developments of the modern world. As we think about social changes and events, we can
always find some continuity between the past and the present.
In my opinion, a lot of modern research on the Czech Republic and Slovakia
suggests that social, cultural, historical and economic differences between the Czech and
Slovak nations not only led former Czechoslovakia to its division into two separate states
in 1939 and again in 1993 but also led to Slovakia's problems of statehood. Recently,
these problems contributed to the anti-democratic development in Slovakia and to its
exclusion from the first wave of NATO enlargement and the European Union, which is
more fully discussed in the third and fourth chapters of this thesis.
Czechoslovakia as a small state in the heart of Europe played a significant role in
European history. Josef Kalvoda in his book The Genesis of Czechoslovakia points out:
10
Indeed, the history of the Czech and Slovak peoples has been intimately
linked with the history of all Europe, and all the upheavals that have
affected this small country in the heart of Europe have had international
repercussions. The Munich crisis of 1938, the events of February 1948
[Communist coup in Czechoslovakia], and the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 provide proof of the above observations which
have been valid in the past, are valid today, and will remain valid in the
future. 13
This second chapter presents a historical chronology of the Czech and Slovak
Republic from the time they proclaimed the first common state, the Czechoslovak
Republic, in 1918 to their separation into two republics, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, in 1993. Today, as of this writing, when Czechs and Slovaks are celebrating
the 80th anniversary of Czechoslovak independence on October 28, 1998, many Czechs
and Slovaks now question whether it was right to divide the common state and whether it
would have been better for the two nations to remain whole. This chapter will stress the
most important milestones in the Czech-Slovak common history and point out some
differences between the Czechs and Slovaks that led to the different political outcomes.
First, this chapter will discuss the European security order that enabled Czechs and
Slovaks to create the independent state of Czechoslovakia, later shattered by Nazi
Germany. Secondly, this chapter will analyze the period of Communist influence in the
country. Finally this chapter will discuss the Communist collapse in the country and the
Josef Kalvoda, "Introduction," The Genesis of Czechoslovakia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 1
.
11
division of Czechoslovakia after almost seventy-five years of being the dual Czech and
Slovak states.
A. THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC IN THE POST-WORLD
WAR I ERA
After the First World War (1914-1918), the Bismarckian security system had
vanished. The system from 1815 to 1914, sometimes called the *'balance-of-power
system," the system in which ''power is distributed among several nations with
approximate equality," 14 had completely disintegrated. 15 This disintegration happened
not only because the First World War had shown the failure of the international security
system of secret alliances and diplomacy among the five powers (Great Britain, France,
the German Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire), but also
because of the destruction of the German, Russian, and Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The
German and Russian Empire succumbed to revolution and the Austrian-Hungarian
Empire had shattered into its constituent parts (Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria,
Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania). 16 Yet, fortunately, possibilities for creating
a new "effective" security system then appeared.
14 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Balance of Power," in Phil Williams. Donald M. Goldstein and Jay M. Shafritz'. ed.
Classic Readings of International Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Publishers, 1994), p. 206.
15 Gordon A. Craig and Alexandr L. George, "Balance of Power, 1815-1914: Three Experiments." Force and




In January 1919, hoping to bar such human and material disasters that ensued
from World War I, seventy delegates from twenty-seven victorious nations together with
hundreds of advisors, clerks, and journalists participated in the Paris Peace Conference
with one primary intention: to establish a new global peace that would inhibit other
nations from warring against one other. 17 Nevertheless, an ulterior purpose also existed
at the Paris Peace Conference. The victorious powers desired not only to build peace and
construct a new international system, but they also desired to reorganize the territories of
Europe. Moreover, they sought compensation, retribution, and punishment of the
defeated powers.
In 1918 and 1919 the most-asked questions confronting peacemakers were similar
to those asked today. These questions are 1) How can a new security system be
established in Europe? 2) How can a new international order based on international rule
of law be reestablished? Constructing a new international security structure was
extremely difficult because Germany was not allowed to become a member of the League
of Nations until 1926, nor the Soviet Union until 1934. 18 The situation was also
complicated by nationalistic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. For example in
democratic Czechoslovakia, while Czechs had to deal with the German minority in the
Sudetenland, Slovaks had to fight for their independence from the Magyars.
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At the Paris Conference, Premier Clemenceau of France and other French
delegates supported treaties based on the hundred-year-old system of the balance of
power and of alliances. However, US President, Woodrow Wilson, who personally
participated in the Paris conference, did not support this idea. He called for a "peace
without victory" instead of a "balance of power." On January 22, 1917, in his speech to
the United States Senate on the essentials of peace Wilson declared: "There must be not a
balance of power but a community of power." 19 Wilson's Fourteen Points will be
discussed in slightly more detail in the next section of this chapter.
Wilson wished to establish a community of free nations, a League of Nations,
with peaceful relations with each other. At the end of the conference, Wilson succeeded
with the inception of the League of Nations but was less successful with his program for
world peace—the Fourteen Points that he declared during his address to the Congress on
January 8, 1918.20
However, the League of Nations as a newly-formed institution was very weak and
because of the absence of two major powers, Germany and the Soviet Union, the US
Senate dismissed the League of Nation, labeling it "a conspiracy to involve Americans in








Because of these absences and the British disrespect for the rights of small nations
in the newly-developing international system based on the peaceful principles of the
League of Nations, the French began to build up their own security system, similar to the
old alliance system, which had been preferred by French Premier Clemenceau at the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919.
Thus, France began to build up alliances with Belgium and Poland, and the so-
called "Little Entente" was signed on August 14, 1920. The Little Entente consisted of
three countries. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Because France could not
support its eastern allies sufficiently (owing to the high cost of military assistance), an
alliance "cordon sanitaire" was directed against Russia and Germany. Thus, the French
system, after the British isolation from the France-German conflict "that had resulted
from a French attempt to prevent Germany from overrunning its eastern ally," was not
effective enough to prevent Germany from invading France's allies.22 As Germany's
domination grew more threatening in the 1930's, Czechoslovakia also signed a pact with
the Soviet Union to help Czechoslovakia in case it was needed. However a previous
agreement between France and Czechoslovakia had obligated France to help
Czechoslovakia before the Soviet Union took action.
Of course, the French system of alliance and British isolation did not stop the
aggressive tendencies of fascism in Italy in 1922, in Japan in 1937, and in Germany in




when Poland signed the Nazi-Polish Pact with Germany in 1934, the system de facto
ceased to exist. 23
After the infamous 1938 Munich Agreement, there was little left of the new
ineffective post-WWI international system that could stop German aggression, and so
another military conflict escalated into the Second World War, in 1939. After exactly
twenty years 'of a successful democracy in Czechoslovakia, the Munich Agreement
temporarily dismembered the first Czechoslovak Republic and the Czech nation.
Czechoslovakia's effort to become an independent republic consisting of two
major nations, Czech and Slovak, is discussed below.
1. Proclamation of Czechoslovakia's Independence in 1918: Czech and
Slovak Domestic Politics
The turn of the nineteenth century brought the Czech National Revival, which was
a significant milestone in the restoration of Czech statehood and later in the building of
the first independent Czechoslovakia.24 On July 3, 1866, when Austria suffered heavy
losses in the war with Bismarck's Prussia in the Battle of Sadova near the Bohemian
town of Hradec Kralove, Austria de facto lost its existence and became an ally of
Prussianized Germany. Then, in 1867, the Habsburgs transformed the Austrian Empire
into the dual Austro-Hungarian Empire and constitutional monarchy.
23
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, all the lands of Czech and Slovak were
part of the Austrio-Hungarian Empire in the framework of the Habsburg confederation.
The changes of the international system that took place during the Czech National
Revival and the First World War contributed to the breakdown of the Habsburg monarchy
that enabled the rise of the new states such as Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria, Poland,
Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Independent Czechoslovakia, consisting of
Bohemia, Moravia, part of Silesia, Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian
Russia) rose from the remains of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire right after the First
World War. Yet the first pro-independence movement of Czechs and Slovaks started
long before the First World War had even begun and the onset for autonomy was known
as the Czech National Revival Movement. The dominant political leaders of the Czech
Revival were "liberals" Frantisek Palacky, with his son-in-law Frantisek Ladislav Rieger,
Karel Havlicek Borovsky, and Josef Jungman, who put together the first Czech
dictionary. At that time the first Czech political parties, the "Old Czech," led by Palacky,
who were not overly opposed to remaining within the Habsburg Empire, and the "Young
Czech," led by Rieger, who were a radical, more liberal party, were founded.
In 1848-1849 Frantisek Palacky was also one of the most original thinkers who
wished to reform Austria by giving it a new ideology for its existence. In 1865, in his
work The Idea of the Austrian State, he made several suggestions for Austria's
reorganization. George J. Kovtun describes Palacky' s ideas as a wish of those who
wanted reforms within the Austrian monarchy:
17
In 1848-1849 Palacky thought that Austria might be transformed into
ethnic-historical groups of territories in which the Czech population of the
Czech lands would be joined by the Slovaks. Frustrated in his hopes, he
put more emphasis on so-called "historical rights" and in [his work], The
Idea of the Austrian State, demanded a federation of territorial units
according to ethnographic, geographic and historical principles. 25
In contrast to Slovakia, after the 1878 crisis in the Balkans, and by the end of the
final decade of the 19th century, Czech society already had nearly all the features of a
modern, developed society. As J.V. Polisensky described in his book History of
Czechoslovakia in Outline, when the Czechs and Southern Slavs went into the Balkans to
fight against German expansion and to help organize the new states of Serbia and
Bulgaria, the situation in Slovakia was growing worse and worse and the transformation
of industry and society was not as progressive as it was in the Czech lands. Polisensky
wrote:
The Slovak stress on their linguistic individuality and their independence
from the rebellious Czechs did not help. From 1874 (to the end of World
War I) the Slovaks had no secondary schools, their national societies were
being prohibited, their poets were growing to be addicts of mysticism and
frustration.26
The situation in Slovakia, which was a part of Hungary within the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire, was much different. Slovakia's only education and culture program.
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called "Matica Slovenska," established in 1860's was soon prohibited. Hungarians also
prohibited the use of the Slovak language in 1975. However, it would be incorrect to say
that an educational system did not exist in Slovakia.27
Because there were more intellectuals in Czech lands than in Slovakia, a number
of rival political factions, such as the conservative Old Czechs and liberal Young Czechs,
the Czech Social Democratic Party (founded in 1878), the progressives, the Agrarian
party, the Christian Socialists, the National Socialists, and the Radical Progressives
showed the complex social stratification. The first general elections to Parliament that
took place, in 1907, showed that the Agrarians and Social Democrats were the strongest
Czech parties.
In 1882 a new academic generation was emerging from the Czech University of
Prague-for example, the Czech University professor, philosopher, and politician, Tomas
Garrigue Masaryk, a successor of Palacky, who had been pushing even more the pro-
independence movement for the Czechs and Slovaks.
-' Owen V. Johnson, "Education and the Making of a Nation," Slovakia 1918-1938 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1985), p. 29.
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After Palacky, Masaryk was the outstanding architect of Czech moral
rearmament, no matter how controversial his views were, imagine this: in
this great, disjointed, aimless Empire ruled by the Habsburgs, Palacky and,
in his footsteps, Masaryk, gave the small Czech nation a great idea and
clear orientation. The history of the Czech nation, they taught, is a
meaningful part of world history. The Czechs deserved recognition as the
carriers of universal values in view of their struggle for spiritual freedom.
In this way Palacky, with Masaryk as his successor, linked Czech
historical and existence efforts to human progress and the quest for
democracy. 28
Both Palacky and Masaryk wanted to establish a Czech state in the Austrian
federation. Like Palacky, Masaryk realized that this idea together with pro-Austrian
activities was rather more unrealistic than unsuccessful. "The problem of Austria was the
problem of the emancipation of many nations but for the Czech the problem was the
Germans."29 The Germans who were minorities living in the Czech lands never agreed
with the idea of restoring the Czech state in the Austrian Empire. 30
The Balkans crisis from 1907 to 1914 resulted in the tension between Vienna and
Belgrade over Bosnia Herzegovina. When the imperial successor to the Austrian-
Hungarian throne, Austrian Crown-Prince Francis Ferdinand d'Este, was assassinated in
Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, the immediate war on Serbia declared by Germany escalated
2° George J. Kovtun, 'T.G. Masaryk: The Problem of a Small Nation," in H. Gordon Skilling, ed., Czechoslovakia





to the First World War in July 1914. These events without any doubt helped advance the
final realization of long-held Czech aspirations for its independence. 31
At the very beginning of the First World War, the Czechs became unified in their
opposition to the Austrian-Hungarian government. Austria-Hungary's alignment with
Germany led to the restriction of democratic rights in the Czech lands and the arrest of
the Czech politicians. A quick German victory would increase German domination in
Central Europe, so Czech and Slovak soldiers refused to fight against other Slavs and
deserted to the Russians and later to the Italians. At the same time, many representatives
of the opposition, including the leader of the small "Realistic Party," T.G. Masaryk, left
the country. Masaryk left in December of 1914 for London, where he, in official Czech
resistance against Vienna, continued to fight for Czechoslovakian independence
throughout the war.
It was during that exile when T.G. Masaryk first came up with the idea of creating
a joint country together with the neighboring land of Slovakia that had been ruled by
Hungarians for centuries. He worked closely with other members of the opposition,
Czech lawyer Dr. Edward Benes, author of a book with the "uncompromising title:
Detruisez V Austriche-Hongrie"1 (Destroy Austria-Hungary!) (1916), and Slovak
astronomer M.R. Stefanik, who was active in Paris. 32
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Czech and Slovak soldiers who fought alongside the allies, France, Great Britain,
Italy, and later the US, also contributed to the Czechoslovakian independence. At the
beginning of 1915, these Czechs and Slovaks soldiers formed the first Czechoslovak
military units, the Czechoslovak Legions, which went to Serbia to fight German and
Austro-Hungarian troops. They even fought against Bolshevik forces in Russia.
In 1916, the three political leaders, T.G. Masaryk, Benes, and Stefanik founded
abroad the Czech National Council, which later was renamed the Czechoslovak National
Council and was recognized as the first government of Czechoslovakia by Allies leaders
in 1918. In 1917, T.G. Masaryk went to the US where he continued his political
initiative.
On January 18, 1918, President Wilson proclaimed his famous program for world
peace, the Fourteen Points, which called for "open covenants of peace," a readjustment of
European boundaries on the principles of "independent determination," an "opportunity
of autonomous development" of Austria-Hungary, and the establishment of a "general
association of nations ... for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."33 Following this
proclamation, the Czechs and Slovaks who were seeking autonomy signed the "Treaty of
33 Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points," in Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein and Jay M. Shafritz, Classic
Readings of International Relations, ed., (Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994). pp. 18-20.
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Pittsburgh" which formed a joint state composed of two nations, Czech and Slovak. This
was signed at Independence Hall in Philadelphia in May 1918.34
When the situation was quite apparently not in German and Austria-Hungary's
favor and as they anticipated defeat, the first Czechoslovak Republic was declared, on
October 28, 1918, and on November 14, 1918, T.G. Masaryk was elected
Czechoslovakia's first President by the National Assembly (the Parliament). Slovakia
joined the common state on October 30, 1918, by the Turciansky Svaty Martin's
Declaration. As Stanislav J. Kirschbaum pointed out in his book The Czechoslovak
Orientation, "The formation of the new state, which included Slovakia, became a matter
that concerned primarily Czech politics."35 Because the Czechoslovak Republic was a
multi-ethnic state composed of the Czechs and Slovaks nations, and German, Polish,
Hungarian, and Ruthenian minorities, the first months of the state were by no means easy.
For instance, Germans and Hungarians protested persistently against being
governed by the Czechs and Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic. This
relationship caused an uneasy situation during the birth of the first Czechoslovak
Republic. As R. A. C. Parker, author of a book, The Second World War, noted, the new
boundaries gave not only more reason for German "xenophobic nationalism," but it also
made some Germans dislike the "continued separation of German-speaking Austrians
John O. Crane and Sylvia Crane, " Masaryk in America." Czechoslovakia (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1991 ), p.
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from Germany and the rule of Czechs over Germans following the breakup of the
Habsburg monarchy and the creation of Czechoslovakia."36
Because both the society and industry in the Czech lands were among the most
advanced in Europe, Czechoslovakia quickly became one of the strongest economic states
among the world's ten most developed industrial-agrarian countries. The Skoda plant in
Pilsen, for example, had been the most important armaments industry in the monarchy.
Since that time, we have continually observed significant economic, cultural, and
industrial differences between the two nations, Czechs and Slovaks, that decided to live
in one state—Czechoslovakia.
The Czech lands, Moravia, and part of Silesia were more developed than Slovakia
and Carpatho-Ruthenia because the first three regions belonged to the Austrian part of the
Austrian-Hungarian Empire, one of the most industrially developed parts of Europe.
However, the latter belonged to the Hungarian part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the
most agrarian lands of Central and Eastern Europe. These two different regions were also
ruled by different sovereigns and had different national interests and different cultural
orientations. Further, the composition of intellectuals and a well-educated public was
vastly different in these two states. In my opinion, these basic differences between the
Czech and Slovak regions explain some of the differences between Czech and Slovak
36 R. A.C. Parker, "Hitler. Germany, and the Origins of the European War," The Second World War: A Short History,
rev. ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). p. 2.
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societies. As Hugh Seton-Watson argues, "the Slovak people were both economically
and politically primitive." As soon as Slovaks became independent from Hungary within
the young Czechoslovak Republic, national problems appeared. Because there were few
qualified Slovak people capable of working in administrative institutions in Slovakia, in
spite of the famous Pittsburgh Agreement promising Slovaks a "Slovak Diet, autonomous
administration and law courts, and the use of the Slovak language as an official language
in public affairs and schools in Slovakia," many Czechs had to occupy these
administration positions. 37
Since that time, the beginning of one state with two major ethnic groups, Czechs
and Slovaks, can be considered as not only the successful beginning of a democratic
Czechoslovak state in Europe but also the beginning of Slovak national self-
determination. This would lead to Slovak's independence after the 1938 Munich
Agreement that turned Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland over to the Nazi-German Reich, in
1939 and after the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1992.
2. Munich Agreement in 1938
Despite the fact that France had a security agreement and a military treaty with
Czechoslovakia, the four great powers at that time, represented by Adolf Hitler
(Germany), Neville Chamberlain (Great Britain), Edouard Daladier (France), and Benito
Mussoliny (Italy), on September 29, 1938, in Munich, Germany, agreed on the cession of
37 Hugh Seton-Watson, "Political Experience, 1918-39: Czech and Slovak," Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-
1941 (Boulder. Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p. 175.
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the border territories of the Czech Lands, the territories which became known as
Sudetenland, to Nazi Germany. Although the meeting was to decide about the existence
of Czechoslovakia, its representatives were not invited to Munich.
The Munich Agreement meant not only a catastrophic historic and moral disaster
for the Czech people but also a grand disappointment for the Czech and Slovak nations in
Europe. It also influenced Czechoslovakian behavior in the political field after the
Second World War and some of the recent characteristics of the Czech and Slovak
peoples. Ignorance about a small nation by the Western countries dismembered the
Czechoslovak Republic, which had already established a genuine Parliamentary
democracy, guaranteed by the Constitution of February 1920, declared its independence
in 1918, and successfully existed for exactly twenty years.38
As a result of the Munich Agreement, Germany annexed thirty-eight percent of
the Czech lands, Hungary obtained southern and southeastern regions of Slovakia and
Ruthenia, and Poland obtained an eastern part of the Czech lands, and Silesia, the most
industrially valuable part, the Tesin region of Silesia.
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Figure II-l A Map of Czechoslovakia in 1938
Source: "Map of Czechoslovakia Showing Sudetenland." 30 April 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://sorrel.humboldt.edu/-rescuers/book/Chlup/chlupgif/czechmap2.html> [28 October 1998].
As the map (Figure II-l) shows above, the remainder of Czechoslovakia was
transformed into Czecho-Slovakia. 39
Edvard Benes succeeded T.G. Masaryk, who resigned from office in 1935 due to
illness. He stood at the head of the Czechoslovak Republic during the events of 1938 and
under international pressure was forced to accept the conclusion of the meeting on
September 30, 1938, one day after the Munich Agreement.
Czechoslovakia was simply left abandoned by its allies and there was nothing left
to stop the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian state or to stop Nazi Germany from seizing
the remainder of the Czechoslovak Republic, Czecho-Slovakia. The fall of the First
39 Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonfn, "Dismemberment and Restitution: Various Kinds of Authoritarian Rule."
Czechoslovakia 1918-92 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 19.
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Czechoslovakian state continued, mostly due to the three factors: firstly, by the dismissal
of President Benes, who had to resign on October 5, 1938, and was exiled to Great
Britain; secondly, by the first occupation of the Czech lands in the history of
Czechoslovakia, when Hitler crushed the remainder of Czechoslovakia which was
militarily well prepared, but which, based on government decisions, did not resist the
German invasion. Hence Hitler established the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as a
part of the Great German Reich on March 15, 1939. Then Emil Hacha was made the
"President" of the Protectorate. Finally, the Slovak struggle for its autonomy was led by
the People's Party of Hlinka in 1928, and succeeded in the proclamation of the first
"independence state" of Slovakia (later considered Germany's ally) on March 14, 1939,
as Jozef Tiso, a Catholic priest, was named the first Slovak President.
The occupation of the Protectorate of the Czech lands and Moravia was firmly
rejected by the Czech population, although pulling together an armed resistance was not
in its power. As publisher Lumir Tucek pointed out, although President Benes was an
experienced man in international politics, armed-resistance against Nazi-Germany would
have meant suicide for the Czech nation. The fact that Czech Germans who supported
Hitler lived as a minority in Sudetenland, which was annexed by Nazi Germany, led
President Benes to decide not to fight the German occupiers. A military confrontation
would have had nothing to do with fighting for freedom but rather fighting for ethnic
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goals.40 However, the demonstration on October 28, 1939, and a demonstration at the
funeral of a murdered student, Jan Opletal, were among many Czech protests against the
Nazi occupation. This resulted in the closing of Czech universities on November 17,
1939, the example-setting execution of nine student leaders, and the internment of 1,200
college students in concentration camps.
Although the domestic resistance movement continued, it was no match for the
practices of the Gestapo and suffered heavy losses. In contrast to the domestic resistance
movement, the foreign resistance movement organized by President-in-exile Benes from
London gained a lot of credit. These foreign movements were: 1) Czechoslovakian
pilots' participation in the battle of England 2) the assassination of Reich Protector
Reinhard Heydrich on May 27, 1942, and 3) the formation of a Czechoslovak military
unit in Eastern Europe under the command of Colonel Ludvfk Svoboda. This unit first
went to battle in the early spring of 1943 and later took part in the liberation of
Czechoslovakia alongside the Soviet Army in 1944-45.
A much different situation was developing in Slovakia. In contrast to the
Czechoslovak activities led by President Benes, Slovakia' was considered Germany's ally
because the Slovak state had supported Hitler from 1939-44. Thus Slovakia in the event
of the capitulation of Germany would be considered a defeated country. However, the
40 Lumfr Tucek, "Mnichov: Hajit Zemi Proti Cele Evrope? (Defend the Country against all Europe?).'" Dues, 24
September 1998, p. 13.
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beginning of the uprising in Slovakia on August 29, 1944, when the Germans retreated on
the Eastern Front, improved Slovakia's international reputation.
The southwestern part of Czechoslovakia was actually first liberated by American
troops, but because of a prior agreement between the Soviet Union and the US, the
American troops could not proceed towards Prague. The Soviet tanks that rolled into
Prague only one day after the capitulation of Germany on May 9, 1945, brought the final
liberation of Czechoslovakia. Once again, the re-establishment of independent
Czechoslovakia, sometimes called the Third Czechoslovak Republic, with President
Benes at its head was announced.
B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA
The restored Second Czechoslovak Republic led by President Benes significantly
differed from the First Republic not only in the geographic contours of the country (the
Soviet Union acquired Subcarpathian Russia on June 29, 1945), but also in the national
composition of the population. These significant changes in the composition of
Czechoslovakian society resulted mainly from the transfer of an estimated three million
German inhabitants living on Czech lands and Moravia into defeated Germany. At the
same time, by "National Decrees" issued by President Benes on October 24, 1945,
property owned by German collaborators and traitors was confiscated and mines, key
industries, banks, and insurance companies were nationalized.41
41 Jaroslav Krejci. "In Frontline Again." Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads ofEuropean History (New York: St
Martin's Press. 1990), pp. 175-176.
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Even today, the displaced Germans and their descendants who settled in Germany
declare their outrage at the event and hope to have their lands returned to them. At times
their powerful political lobby has had unfortunate effects on German-Czech relations^
even in the last few years.
1. Communist Coup and the End of Democracy in Czechoslovakia in
1948
In Czechoslovakia, only one year later, during the 1946 Parliamentary elections,
the Communists took a strong position against political parties compromised of fascists.
Communists, who after the German defeat enjoyed the trust of the majority of
Czechoslovakians, blamed other political parties for accepting the Munich Agreement
and triumphed with forty percent of the vote. In the fall of 1947, the Communists broke
the dominance of the Democratic Party in Slovakia and finalized their dominance in a
Communist coup in Czechoslovakia on February 25, 1948. Klement Gottwald, who was
also Secretary of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party, proclaimed a Communist
governmental state of crisis. This forced President Benes to resign. The Communist
coup began in February 1948, when twelve ministers of the governing coalition resigned,
protesting the illegal promotion of Communist police officers. On February 20, 1948,
President Benes, rather than calling for new Parliamentary elections as was expected, was
forced to fill the vacant positions with Communist candidates. Benes resigned shortly
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after he refused to sign a new constitution guaranteeing a "dominant role" for the
Communist Party, which was passed by the Parliament on May 9, 1948.
This Communist victory meant the end of democracy in Czechoslovakia for more
than forty years and forced Czechoslovakia's international relations towards the Soviet
Union. This Soviet orientation was in reality truly decisive for further anti-democratic
developments in Czechoslovakia.
2. Application of the Soviet Experience in Czechoslovakia
Based on the decisions made by the heads of the three victorious powers.
Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, at the Yalta conference, Czechoslovakia came into the
Soviet sphere of influence, and the Communist Party under Gottwald's leadership
followed Stalin's directives for a so-called Czechoslovakian path to socialism. Under
Communist rule, there was only a single ballot at elections (citizens could only vote for
one joint ticket) with a tremendous Communist majority in Parliament, which became
merely a formal entity of Communist totalitarianism, supposedly symbolizing the unity of
people and state.
About two-thirds of the overall industrial capacity of the country at that time
representing more than 3,000 companies and all banks, was nationalized. Also
agriculture was forcibly collectivized. All newspapers that were too critical of the leading
party were simply forbidden, and regime opponents were sent off to the uranium mining
work camps or sentenced to death.
On June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall devised and
proposed a plan, later known as the Marshall Plan, offering U.S. assistance to all
32
European countries. Czechoslovakia was the first to consider accepting the Marshall
Plan, but after consultations with Stalin, who in June of 1946 had already refused Soviet
participation in the plan, Czechoslovakia refused the aid as well.42 In 1949, instead of
taking advantage of the Marshall Plan, Czechoslovakia entered into the Soviet-dictated
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and this was followed, in 1995,
by Czechoslovakia's entry into the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact which was
intended to create a counterbalance to the six-year-old NATO.
The disagreement regarding the Czechoslovakian path to socialism and the
restructuring of the "socialist market economy" based on the Stalinist model had
increased with both Stalin's and Gottwald's deaths in 1953. When Soviet party leader
Nikita Khrushchev exposed the crimes of Stalinism in 1956, Antonin Novotny, the
national Communist party leader, suddenly changed his position and began to call for
reform.
3. Invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Armies of Five States of the
Warsaw Pact in 1968
In the face of the growing power of reformers calling for political and economic
changes in 1960's, the Communists adopted a new constitution and announced the




1960 changed the name of the country to "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic"
(CSSR).
But the new constitution and new name of the country could not help to slow the
country's rapid economic decline. At the end of 1967, the conflict between Stalinists and
reformers in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party intensified. Then January 1968
culminated in the election of a Slovak Communist, Alexandr Dubcek, to the post of First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the place of Antonin Novotny,
whose presidental post was filled by General Ludvfk Svoboda on March 30, 1968, after
Novotny resigned on January 4, 1968.
January 1968 came to be known as the beginning of the "Prague Spring" in
Czechoslovakia. Reforms brought political, economic, and cultural freedom. Press and
television censorship were lifted under Alexandr Dubcek's plan for introducing of
"Socialism with a human face." Dubcek's leadership, an attempt at political and
economic reform was undertaken for the first time since 1948. At this time, the
government proclaimed the legitimacy of basic human rights and liberties in
Czechoslovakia and criticized the policies of the past.43
Unfortunately, the "Prague Spring" was brought to a halt on August 20, 1968 by
the military intervention of the five member states of the Warsaw Pact: the USSR and
four neighboring "brother states," Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
43 Jaromfr Navratil, Antonin Bencik, Vaclav Kural, Marie Michalkova, and Jitka Vondrova, eds., "A Sun Suddenly
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and Bulgaria. The invasion was justified as the means "to secure the socialist system in
Czechoslovakia and to ensure the security of the whole socialist community."44
The Czechs and Slovaks saw the arrival of the Russian tanks with shock and
outrage and gave passive and chaotic resistance. Alexandr Dubcek and the other Prague
Spring leaders were forced to go to Moscow to negotiate the capitulation of Dubcek's
government. While they were imprisoned briefly in Moscow, they were forced to sign a
defeatist Moscow memorandum in which Czechs and Slovak signatories agreed to the
"temporary" presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.
Although the Western democracies knew in advance about the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, nothing could be done to help Czechoslovakia's first attempt to return to
a democratic state. Possible help from the United States, which was engaged in the
Vietnam War at that time, or help from other Western democracies could have easily led
to a military conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs. This meant that
Czechoslovakia was left abandoned by Western democracies once again, as it had been
thirty years earlier in the Munich Agreement in 1938.
After the failure of the Prague Spring, Czechoslovak reformists tried to preserve at
least some of the achievements of their reform efforts. On October 28, 1968, the
Czechoslovak National Assembly approved a new constitutional law on the creation of a
^ Jaroslav Krejci. "In Frontline Again," Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads ofEuropean History (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 189-190.
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Czechoslovak Federation, which was to be divided internally into the two separate Czech
and Slovak Republics by January 1, 1969. But two months later, the Federal Assembly
adopted a new constitutional law undermining the previous amendment, meaning that the
new federation existed in name only.
At that time, many reformers were sentenced to long jail terms, thousands of
people were removed from their jobs, and many people from both the civilian or military
sectors were expelled from the Communist Party and the army. About 140,000 people
emigrated to the west as a result of the failure of the Prague Spring.45 Many of those
people who stayed behind continued to protest the Soviet invasion. In the most famous of
the individual acts of protest, in January 1969, a young philosophy student, Jan Palach,
immolated himself in public.
On April 17, 1969, Alexandr Dubcek had to resign his office in favor of a Slovak
Communist, Gustav Husak, who became General Secretary of the Communist Party.
After President Svoboda was forced to resign due to illness, Husak was elected in his
place in 1975. Husak' s period of the "normalization," from the 1970s to 1989, led to the
economic devastation of the country and to the moral decay of society, lasting more than
twenty years, during which the republic seemed veritably crippled.
Although Czechoslovakia signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 as one of the
thirty-five member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation and agreed to




developments in Czechoslovakia, including the violation of human rights, opened a
"window of opportunity" for opponents of the Communist authoritative regime in
Czechoslovakia.46
Sidney Tarrow stated that "Once the social movement was created, its challenge
shaped the future relations between states and collective action across state
boundaries."47 In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 was the oldest, best-known, and most
significant independent social movement. This organization dedicated to the promotion
of human rights.48 Its members, which included ex-Communists, anti-Communists,
Christian dissidents, and secular humanists, intellectuals, artists, and writers, were often
jailed, as was the case of the Chartist founding leader, the playwright Vaclav Havel.
Other groups were the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted, the
Independent Peace Association, Czech Children, the Movement for Civic Liberty, the
Jazz Section, the Club of Friends of the USA, the Ecological Committee, and several
smaller groups.49
4" Carol Skalnik Leff, "Czechoslovakia under Communism," The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State
(Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1997), p. 61. The Helsinky Rights Accords played a significant role for
democratization in Eastern Europe, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 89-94.
47 Sidney Tarrow, "State and Social Movements," Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), p. 62.
48 Vladimir V. Kusin, "The Charter," From Dubcek to Charter 77 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 304-307.
49 Ladislav Holy, "Nation against State," The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 29.
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This social movement in Czechoslovakia was accelerated by Mikhail Gorbachev's
accession to the leadership of the Soviet Union when the reform programs of
"perestroika" and "glasnost" took shape.
C. THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Because of these 1989's events in the Soviet Union, human rights violations in
Czechoslovakia and the fact that the Communist Party leaders were not able to restructure
the worsening socialist economy, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia collapsed and
resigned control of the country in November 1989, in response to massive
demonstrations. This happened even after the Communist Party made the changes in
personnel, such as on the posts of the Communist leadership in which Milos Jakes
replaced Gustav Husak and became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1987.
1. The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in November 1989
The Velvet Revolution started on November 17, 1989, on the occasion of the
fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. This revolution began
only eight days after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Czech students, "at a regime-approved
march to commemorate the first student killed in the Nazi invasion turned the march into
an anti-regime demonstration and were brutally beaten by the state police."50
50 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Post-Communist Europe: The Most Complex Paths and Tasks," Problems Of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996), p. 325.
These events led to a general strike and because of the lack of Communist
reformers in Czech and Slovak cities all over the country and the military officials'
promise that "the army would not fight the people," the Communist regime at the close of
1989 simply collapsed, which was eloquently confirmed by the resignation of Communist
President Gustav Husak on December 9, 1989. Vaclav Havel was then elected as the new
President of Czechoslovakia on December 29, 1989. 51
Quickly following these events, Czechoslovak citizens formed two official spoke-
groups, "the Civic Forum" (OF) in the Czech lands and "Public against Violence" (VPN)
in Slovakia, which in the June 1990 elections overwhelmingly won in both parts of
Czechoslovakia. Then, once again, the possibilities of establishing a democratic state
based on Western ideologies returned to Czechoslovakia.
2. Withdrawal of the Soviet Troops from Czechoslovakia in 1991
Beside the anti-regime group Charter 77, there were various independent
initiatives, which rather than organizing demonstrations against the Communist regime to
support their political demands, formulated various petitions publicly well known. For
example, on the twentieth anniversary of Czechoslovakia's occupation by the five armies




The Independent Peace Association was calling for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, free elections with multiple
candidates, the abolition of censorship, the observance of basic human
rights in accordance with international agreements signed by the
Czechoslovakia government, and the release of all political prisoners.52
These independent initiatives were not as effective as expected because of the
Communist repression and prosecution of its leaders. However, the November 1989
events in Czechoslovakia that opened a new chapter in the country's history by returning
the democratic traditions of the Masaryk's era also enabled negotiations with the Soviet
Union about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.
One of the top "foreign policy priority of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution was
to establish Czechoslovakia's sovereignty after long decades of Soviet hegemony."53 As
soon as the Soviet leadership during Gorbachev's reforms admitted that the 1968
Czechoslovak invasion was a mistake, Czechoslovak leaders began to negotiate with the
Soviet Union on the issue of troop withdrawal since such military forces had no reason to
stay in Czechoslovakia any longer. In the beginning of 1990, both sides surprisingly and
quickly agreed on the complete withdrawal of the nearly 74,000 Soviet troops by the end
of June 1991.54 This included 17,000 officers, Soviet nuclear forces with conventional
units of 1,220 main battle tanks and 2,505 armored vehicles. The Soviet troops withdrew
52 Ladislav Holy, "Nation against State," The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 48-49.
53 Carol Skalnik Leff, "The Search for a Mew Security Order in International Relations," The Czech and Slovak




from eighty-five military bases and left behind them thousands of empty buildings.55
According to the withdrawal agreement, the last Soviet tank left Czechoslovakia three
months early, on March 27, 1991.56
3. Separation of Czechoslovakia in 1992 and 1993
The question of the Czech-Slovak mutual relationship and the coexistence of the
two major nations had increased with the nationwide general elections of 1992, when the
Czechs overwhelmingly voted for Vaclav Klaus, the leader of the Civic Democratic Party
(ODS) established from the Civic Forum (OF), and the Slovaks voted for Vladimir
Meciar, leader of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) established from the
Public Against Violence (VPN). This led to the peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia
into two separate independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic
(Slovakia), effective at midnight on December 31, 1992, barely three years after the
Velvet Revolution.
a) Slovak Exceptionalism
As Miroslav Kusy, analyst of Czech and Slovak affairs, argues, the
"Slovak question," or "Slovak exceptionalism," was much discussed among foreign and
domestic analysts a long time before Czechoslovakia's separation. He wrote:
55
"Red Army Occupation Ends After 23 Years." 25 June 1991. Agence France Presse, 25 June 1991. Available
[Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 2.
5
" "Slovensko a Demokratizacia (Slovakia and Democratization)." 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.iips.com/slovensko/hidemokr.htm> [31 August 1998], p. 1.
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Slovakia was too different, it was claimed: it was oriented in quite a
different direction from the Czech Lands; Slovaks were too different from
Czechs, and so their joint state was only an artificially and forcibly
maintained entity, incapable of an independent and democratic life....
There existed several stereotyped view of the position of Slovakia....
Some of these stereotypes described reality truthfully, but only
superficially, while others distorted or simply contradicted reality.... Such
standard characteristics of the Slovaks with Czechs can be identified:
1) Slovaks are more nationalistically oriented;
2) Slovaks are more separatistically oriented;
3) Slovaks are more Christian-oriented;
4) Slovaks are more left-wing; and
5) Slovaks are more eastwardly oriented. 57
Although Slovakia has changed, we can still observe some of these
characteristics (more fully discussed in the third chapter of this thesis) in the country's
domestic politics represented by the minorities in the Slovakian leadership.
As many experts argue, in spite of social, cultural, historical, and
economic differences, the main reasons for the separation were the conflicting opinions of
the Czechs and Slovaks on the rapid market reforms promoted by Vaclav Klaus and the
nationalistic demands of Vladimir Meciar for Slovak autonomy. As Carol Skalnik Leff
wrote:
5
' Miroslav Kusy, "'Slovak Exceptionalism," in Jin Musil, The End of Czechoslovakia, ed., (New York: Central
European University Press, 1995), p. 139-140.
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The disintegration of the state in 1992 was the culmination of a long
history of failed Czech and Slovak efforts to devise a mutually satisfactory
arrangement for coexistence in a common state... the lack of a vigorous
independence sentiment on either side... the federal structure and its
minority veto provision, the segmented Czech and Slovak party systems,
the historically conditioned atmosphere of mutual distrust, and the
differential impact of economic reform all combined to undercut the
chances of a settlement.
Competitive elections put the national question firmly on the agenda, and
the functioning of a genuinely representative Federal Assembly prevented
any move to smother that question.58
There were certainly some doubts about the intention behind the breakup
of Czechoslovakia among Czech and Slovak citizens. As Table II- 1 below indicates, in
contrast to the Slovaks, from November 1991 to July 1992, the Czechs were more for a
"unitary state" or "federations" and less for an "independent state."
However, the Parliamentary decision not to have a referendum on the
disintegration of the state at the end of 1992 relinquished the legislative power to the
Czech Prime Minister and Chairman of the ODS, Vaclav Klaus, and the Slovak
nationalist leader and Chairman of the HZDS, Vladimir Meciar, and so they agreed on the
division of Czechoslovakia.
5° Carol Skalnik Leff, "National Identity and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia," The Czech and Slovak Republics:
Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 143-144.
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Table II- 1 Public Opinion on the State Structure and the Preferred Form of
Czech-Slovak Relationship in Czechoslovakia in 1992
(figures in percent; CR - Czech Republic, SR - Slovak Republic)
Type of state Nov Dec Jan Mar May June July
Arrangement 199 1 122L 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992
CR SR CR SR CR SR CR SR CR SR CR SR CR SR
Unitary state 39 20 36 17 38 17 34 13 34 12 29 11 38 14
Federation 30 26 27 31 32 33 27 24 28 33 28 26 19 27
Lands-based 20 6 24 4 15 5 18 9 22 6 21 6 18 8
Republic
Confederation 4 27 4 30 4 30 6 32 6 31 5 31 3 30
Independent state 5 14 6 11 5 12 11 17 6 11 13 18 16 16
Don't know 27 3763 45 4 748 65
Sources: Sharon L. Wolchik, "Table 12. 3 Preferred State Arrangement, 1991 and 1992 (in %)," in Jifi Musil, The End
of Czechoslovakia, ed., (New York: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 234.
Yet even though there was no political movement to stop the separation, or to call
for unification, after a short negotiation between the two sides and after several attempts,
the Federal Parliament succeeded in creating a constitutional law about the division of the
Czech and Slovak nations. Therefore, the separation, sometimes called the "Velvet
Divorce," of January 1, 1993, was not only peaceful and democratic, but also completely
legal. Since that time, the two new republics have appeared on the world map and
stepped forward to continue the process of state-building based on democratic principles,
each in its own way.
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III. STATE TRANSITION - RETURN TO DEMOCRACY
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting
indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected
representatives. 59 — Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl
A. INTRODUCTION
While the 1948 Communist coup brought an end to democracy in the thirty-year-
old democratic Czechoslovakia, the November 1989 events returned democracy to the
Czech and the Slovak Socialist Republic (CSSR). After almost forty-one years, the
newly-established government began to listen to its citizens. The new President of
Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, said in his New Year's Address to the nation on January
1, 1990: "People, your government has returned to you!"60 Thus, the democratic
traditions of Czechs and Slovaks returned to Czechoslovakia. In 1989, after
overthrowing the one-party government, Czechoslovakian citizens found new freedom
—
the right to form political parties and movements according to their political convictions.
Hence, very soon after the fall of the totalitarian regime, a colorful variety of political
parties was established and provided the foundations for a more stable political climate in
-*y Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is...And Is Not," in The Global Resurgence of
Democracy, eds., Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 40.
60 Vaclav Havel, "New Year's Address to the Nation," 1 January 1990. Available [Online]:
<http://scol.hrad.cz/presidentyHavel/speeches/index_uk.html> [9 October 1998], p. 1.
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which the people could benefit from a fully Parliamentary democracy, including free
speech, free elections, and a vigorously free media.
This chapter explores Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's analysis of this democratic
transition, a transition engendered by the collapse of "frozen" post-totalitarianism.61 The
first part of this chapter further analyzes the November 1989 events in Czechoslovakia
when the country's transition to a consolidated democracy emerged after the Communist
Party thoroughly collapsed.
As Linz and Stepan argue, the basic condition for democracy to be consolidated is
that "democracy is a form of governance of state. Thus, no modern polity can become
democratically consolidated unless it is first a state."62 In this chapter, I argue that post-
WW II Czechoslovakia was not a unified state as it had been from 1918 to 1938;
therefore, a consolidated democracy in the country was impossible unless Czechoslovakia
was divided. The second and third parts of this chapter will compare the Czech Republic
and Slovakia and their basic political systems, government policies, political societies,
economies, and civil-military relations.
This chapter concludes by comparing the consequences of the successful Czech
transition to democracy and the Slovak democratization failure caused mostly by
61 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. "Modern Nondemocratic Regimes," Problems ofDemocratic Transition and




Slovakia's leadership, which has negatively impacted Slovakia's international relations
and the Euro-Atlantic integration.
B. DEMOCRATIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Having explained the historical background of Czechoslovakia in the second
chapter, I must now stress once again that Czechoslovakia, in contrast to the other Central
European's countries, was the only state that:
• had one of the strongest traditions of law and the most developed
industry in Central Europe during the Habsburg Empire;
• had a functioning democracy based on American principles from 1918
until 1938 (the time of Czechoslovakia's partition and occupation by
Nazi Germany in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement); and
• had the most developed civil society with the most fully literate
population in Central Europe.63
In contrast to the transitions of the other two NATO invitees, Poland, and
Hungary, these above three factors also led to the rapid return of democracy to
Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia could not have, as Linz and Stepan state, "pacted" a
transition path (as Poland did) or "negotiated" a transition path (as Hungary did) to
democracy. In Poland, "the pacted transitions meant that [their] democracy started with
the old regime's constitution and with the old regime still retaining a strong position in






Movement in Poland from August 1989 until December 1991. In Hungary, the
negotiated transition path meant that the opposition was made up of several parties and
social movements that created an organization called the "Opposition Round Table,"
which negotiated an agreement to have free elections in which they received the most
votes and thereby created a majority coalition government in 1990. 65 In Czechoslovakia
in 1989, after ten days of general public demonstrations, the Communist regime tumbled
because of a disoriented and paralyzed leadership. Since the Czech Communist
leadership could not count on USSR supremacy in Czechoslovakia as it had existed in
1968, suddenly they had little recourse. Thus, at the time of the "Velvet Revolution"
there was no danger of Soviet intervention.
As Linz and Stepan argue, Czechoslovakia did not meet any of the above-
mentioned transition factors to democracy. The democratization process in
Czechoslovakia was characterized as a transition initiated by the destruction of the frozen
post-totalitarian regime "in which collapse, rather than negotiation, [was] a more likely
transition path and ... the opposition, surprised by its unexpected success, normally [had]




"Frozen post-totalitarianian regime" is a regime in which, "despite the persistent tolerance of some civil society
critics of the regime, almost all the other control mechanisms of the party-state stay in place for a long period and do
not evolve (e.g., Czechoslovakia from 1977 to 1989)." See Ibid., pp. 42 and 321.
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On November 17, 1989, the leaders of the Communist regime were totally
unprepared to deal with the mass public demonstration in Czechoslovakia that followed
ten days after the state police brutally beat students in the center of Prague. At this point,
more and more Czechs and Slovaks supported general strikes and called for essential
political and economic changes and the resignation of Communist leaders by chanting
such slogans, as "It is already here" or "Jakes in the trash." Subsequently, the
Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee held an extraordinary session in
which the Presidium of the Communist Party resigned and the lesser-known Communist,
Karel Urbanek was elected as the new head of the Communist Party, replacing the
Secretary General of the Communist Party, Milos Jakes. 67
Fortunately, the armed forces in the country, the people's militia, and the state
police clearly stated that they would not fight against their own people or solve the
persistent political and economic crisis by force. After the resignation of the Communist
Central Committee and the abolition of media censorship, the Civic Forum presented a
list of political demands. The Civic Forum, still led by its spokesman, Vaclav Havel, met
with Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, who agreed to form a new coalition government.
The new coalition government was named by President Husak, who had held the
presidential office since 1975, and who during his last years was seen by Czechoslovak




dominance of Communist power in the country, resigned from the office immediately
after the nomination of this new government, on December 10, 1989.
To know why the Communist Party was toppled, we should recall Vaclav Havel's
famous 1975 "Letter to Dr. Gustav Husak," in which he stated: "In trying to paralyze life,
the authorities paralyze themselves and, in the long run, incapacitate themselves for
paralyzing life."68
After President Husak resigned, the Federal Assembly under Chairman Alexandr
Dubcek, who had led the 1968 Prague Spring movement, elected the Civic Forum's
leader Vaclav Havel as President of Czechoslovakia on December 29, 1989. Completing
the first phase of Czechoslovakia' s transition to a Western-style democracy, the Federal
Assembly re-elected Vaclav Havel as President on July 5, 1990. Members of both the
Federal Assembly and President Havel were elected for an initial two-year term. Their
main goals were to steer the country away from Communist rule. This included
implementing a free-market economy and adopting a new constitution.
1. State Democratization Process: A Chance for Slovakian Autonomy
Followed by the Division of Czechoslovakia
Following both the Communist demise in Czechoslovakia in 1989 and the first
phase of Czechoslovakia's transition, the most important task for the new leadership was
securing its hard-won democracy both nationally and internationally. Soon, the new




gaps in Czechoslovakian human rights and free elections. They also strengthened
freedom of the press and media, private ownership of property, and economic laws.
Czechoslovakia was praised early and often for its peaceful transition from the
Communist regime to a democratic one, yet differences between the country's two major
ethnic groups, the Czechs and the Slovaks, became evident almost immediately and were
quickly exploited by both sides. Besides the historical and economic differences between
the Czechs and Slovaks, there was only four percent Slovaks in the Czech lands and only
one percent Czechs in Slovakia. 69 There was also a special feeling among the Czech and
Slovak people that instead of a unified common state with two major ethnic groups there
were two separated states ruled by one Communist government that acted in favor of the
Czech population. For example, all political centers were located in Prague and all
political decisions were made in Prague as well. Naturally, many Slovaks did not like
this allocation of power that led to the centralization of power in the Czech lands and felt
disenfranchised. As Carol Skalnik Leff has written:
"y Carol Skalnik Leff, "National Identity and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia," The Czech and Slovak Republics:
Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 141.
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Perhaps the most striking aspect of the national tensions in Czech-Slovak
disputes over the constitutional allocation of power is that these conflicts
call into question the Western idea of democracy, which has been based on
a theoretical foundation of individual rights and majority rule. The Slovak
challenge was to the idea of majority rule. Slovak leaders assumed as a
basic article of democratic faith that a system in which the Czech majority
could determine policy for Slovakia was no democracy.... The quarrel
about federation was really a quarrel about what democracy should look
like in a multinational state.70
These factors let to different Czechs and Slovaks opinions on the democratization
process and significantly contributed to the division. Hungarians, as I mentioned earlier,
ruled the Slovaks for a hundred years, and in the Czechoslovak state, the Slovaks now felt
that the Czechs ruled them. Thus, if "democracy is a form of governance of a state," as
Linz and Stepan have remarked, and a consolidated modern democracy cannot exist
without the existence of the state,71 I argue that the "Czech-Slovak conflict" over state
structure led these two nations along the different routes to democracy.
In the early 1990s there were only three countries in the Central and Eastern
Europe region—the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia—that dissolved either
because of the transition from one regime to another, as in the case of the Soviet Union,
or because of an ethnic conflict, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia. In the case of
Czechoslovakia the separation resulted, aside from the above-mentioned historical and
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from the post-Communist regime to the democratic one with rapid economic reforms and
a privatization process; and 2) Slovaks leaders advocated nationalistic issues and called
for more autonomy and a slowing of both the privatization process and economic
reforms.
Vaclav Benda, Catholic dissident and former leader of the Czech Christian
Democrats, comparing election results in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, stated
in one of the main Czech newspapers Lidove Noviny, on September 1, 1992:
In the Czech Republic, the democratic forces won a victory over the non-
democratic crypto-Communist left.... But in the Slovak Republic, 85
percent of mandates were won by nationalistically or even separatistically
oriented, predominantly left-wing, and strongly anti-reformist parties.
The election results confronted us basically with the decision of whether
we want another relapse of socialism in a common state or a democratic
development in an independent Czech Republic.72
The results of the first local and Parliamentary free elections in Czechoslovakia in
1990, where the citizen forces, Civic Forum (OF) and the Public Against Violence
(VPN), received majority votes, overwhelmingly answered the question of whether to
have communism or not. Furthermore, the second nationwide Federal Assembly
(Parliamentary) free elections in Czechoslovakia, completed on June 6, 1992, (Table IJJ-
1) help us to understand the different democratization courses that Czechs and Slovaks
took toward democracy.
' 2 Ladislav Holy, "Self-Stereotypes and National Traditions," The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation (UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 113.
53
Table III-l Second and Last Free Parliamentary Election of Czechoslovakia in
1992
(Figures in percents; number of seats in parentheses)
CZECH REPUBLIC
Major Political Parties




ODS (Civic Democratic Party) 33.90 (20) 33.43 (19) 29.73(17)
CSSD (Social Democratic Party) 7.67 (9) 6.8 (11) 6.53 (9)
LB (Left Block-Communists) 14.27 (12) 14.48 (13) 14.05(11)
LSU (Liberal-Social Union) 5.84 (7) 6.06 (5) 6.52 (8)
ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance) 4.98 (6)
SPR-RSC (Republican Party) 6.48 (4)
SMS (Moravian National Party) 4.23 (4)
KDU (Christian Democratic Union) 5.98 (6)
4.08 (5) 5.93 (6)
6.37 (4) 5.98 (4)
4.90 (5) 5.87 (6)
6.08 (6) 6.28 (8)
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Major Political Parties
House of House of Slovak National
Representatives Nations Council
HZDS (Movement for Demo-
cratic Slovakia)
33.53 (27)
SDL (Left-wing Democratic Party) 14.44 ' (13)
KDH (Christian Democratic 8.96 (9)
Movement)
SDS (Social Democrats) 4.86 (6)
SNS (Slovak National Party) 9.39 (9)
M-E-M (Coalition of Hungarian 7.37 (4)
parties)
33.85 (28) 37.26 (28)
14.04 (11) 14.70 (13)
8.81 (8) 8.88 (9)
6.09 (5) 4.0 (5)
9.35 (12) 7.93 (12)
7.39 (5) 7.42 (4)
Source: "Election Has Finished - What Else?" Carolina, No 30.1. Available [Online]:
<gopher://cucc.ruk.cuni.cz:70/00/carolina/car-eng/archiv/Carolina-E%20No%20030A> [22 September 1998], pp. 1-2.
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At stake in the two days of voting were 300 seats in the new bicameral Federal
Assembly (the House of Representatives and House of Nations) as well as 200 seats in
the Czech National Council and 150 seats in the Slovak National Council.
As these above tables show, by deciding whether to continue with economic
reform or whether to stay in a common federal state of Czechs and Slovaks, voters
definitely showed in the 1992 Czechoslovak elections the differences between the
Czechs' and Slovaks' views on the democratization process. After the 1992 elections, the
situation in Czechoslovakia was very complicated. Regarding the issue of a unified,
single federated state, these tables also show the vast differences between the Czech and
Slovak voters. In Czech lands, the majority of voters aligned themselves with the right-
wing Civil Democratic Party (ODS) and supported a federal country, composed of both
the Czech lands and Slovakia.
However, in Slovakia the election and results were completely the opposite. The
Slovaks Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)—the only right-wing party in
Slovakia—the ultranationalist Slovak National Party, and the majority of Slovaks
strongly supported Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS): "all
claimed," as Leff noted, "to have the 'best' program for defending Slovak interests."73
Their political platform was based on an independent Slovakia completely divorced
politically and economically from the Czech nation. As a result, Czechoslovakia's
73 Carol Skalnik Leff, "The Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the Politics of Democratization," The Czech and Slovak
Republics: Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 90.
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President Havel resigned in July 1992, and left the divorce negotiations to Prime
Ministers Klaus and Meciar. This, as it was argued earlier, proved that a shared future for
the two nations was essentially impossible anymore.
As a result of these differences, since January 1, 1993, these two republics, the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, have begun building their new political
systems, economies, and militaries, and they differ greatly from each other.
As we can see, the complexities of forming a democracy in nations such as the
Czech Republic and Slovakia are immense. A myriad of conditions must be met before a
democratic system can be set in place. Linz and Stepan concluded that "stateness"
problems, particularly the complex relationship between states, nations, and the
democratization process, are so basic that "five other interconnected and mutually
reinforced conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated."74
These elements are
1) The conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil
society;
2) There must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society;
3) There must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens'
freedoms and independent associational life;
4) There must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic
government; and
5) There must be an institutionalized economic society.75
74 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Democracy and Its Arenas," Problems ofDemocratic Transition and




Thus, as Linz and Stepan concluded:
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been
reached about political procedures to produce an elected government,
when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and
popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate
new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other
bodies de jure.76
In Czechoslovakia after July 1992, an agreement on political procedures between
the ODS and HZDS on the forming of a stable federal government was impossible,
especially when Meciar did not want to give up his nationalistic demands for Slovak
autonomy.
Like Linz and Stepan, Adam Przeworski, in his essay, "The Games of Transition,"
also argues that "if democracy is to be consolidated, four problems must be resolved
along the way:
1) An institutional framework for contestation . . . must be constructed;
2) A competitive representative regime must be established;
3) Economic conflict must be channeled into the democratic institutions; and
4) The military must be tucked [maintained] under civilian control."77
76 Ibid., p. 3.
"77 '
'
' Adam Przeworski, "The Games of Transition," in Scott Mainwaring, ed.. Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The
New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992),
p. 106.
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The fourth point of Przeworski's view on consolidated democracy will also help
us understand Slovakia's unstable democracy. A transition to democracy is incomplete if
an effective civilian control of the military is not established. 78 At the end of this chapter,
I will demonstrate that effective civilian control of the military is a basic condition for a
fully-functioning democracy.
Jeffrey Simon, a Central European senior analyst at the Institute for National
Strategic Studies, in his book NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-
Military Relations, catalogued the following four conditions "as being necessary to
determine whether a state is exerting 'effective' democratic ... management of the
military."79 These conditions are:
1) A clear division of authority between president and the government
(prime minister and defense/interior minister) in Constitutions or
through public law;
2) Parliamentary oversight [control] of the military through control of the
defense budget;
3) Peacetime government oversight [control] of General Staff and
military commanders through civilian defense ministries;
4) Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for
the armed forces to be effective.80
78
Ibid., p. 105.
79 Jeffrey Simon, "NATO Enlargement: Blazing the Trail," NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-





As I will later show in my section on the civilian control of the military in both
states, Slovakia in contrast to the Czech Republic did not meet two of Simon's
conditions, the first and third one.
During the last nine years, these issues of civil-military relations in creating new
democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe were major topics of discussion. Such
issues included a) depoliticizing an army in which almost every officer was a member of
the Communist Party; b) establishing a new position of civilian Minister of Defense; and
c) developing a new strategic orientation for the country after the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact to create new national and military defense strategies.
To reveal some other democratization differences that led the Czech Republic
toward democracy and directed Slovakia, because of its problems of statecraft, to a rather
persistingly unstable democracy, I will focus on some of the conditions and problems of a
consolidated democracy. This will include the government policies, elections, political
societies, and economies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, separately.
C. STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AFTER 1993
The Czech Republic, a country in the heart of Europe, situated in Central Europe,
occupies the historical regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and a part of Silesia, with an area of
78,864 square kilometers and a population of 10.4 million. As the map (Figure DI-1)
shows below, the Czech Republic is bound on the north by Poland, on the east by
Slovakia, on the south by Austria, and on its long western border by Germany.
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Since the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Czech Republic has
demonstrated its commitment to the principles defined by a modern community: the rule
of law, a respect for human rights, free and fair elections, the establishment of multi-party








Figure III-l A Map of the Czech Republic in 1998
Source: "Map of the Czech Republic." 10 July 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.eubusiness.com/czech/map.gif> [28 October 1998].
As some Western observers have stated, despite some persisting limitations in
economic reforms, the Czech Republic, with its strong public support for reform, and its
integration into Western supranational structures belongs among the most politically and
economically stable post-Communist states.
1. Political System and Foreign Policy
•
(
Today the Czech Republic is a fully-functioning Parliamentary democracy. The
Czech National Council in its Constitutional Act passed the present Czech Republic
constitution on December 16, 1992.
60
The President of the Czech Republic is the head of the country and Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces. He is elected by a joint session of both Chambers of the
Parliament for the term of five years. Presidential power is limited; however, the most
important power is the right to veto any bill which has already been passed by Parliament,
with the exception of constitutional bills. This power is void in times of constitutional or
other political crises. The President may serve a maximum of two successive terms in
office. The President of the Czech Republic is Vaclav Havel, who after his transitional
two-year term (1990-1992) and the first five-year term (1992-1997), was re-elected in
1997.
The government is the supreme body of executive power. It consists of the Prime
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ministers, and coordinates activities of the
ministries and the central body of the state administration and manages the state
administration throughout the territory of the state. The government has exclusive
legislative initiative in terms of the state budget.
The Parliament, which is the Czech Republic's supreme legislative body, consists
of two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It passes all bills valid in the
territory of the Czech Republic and expresses approval of important international treaties,
such as human rights and basic liberties, political treaties, and general economic treaties.
It decides the most important acts of state, such as declaring war or approving the
deployment of the Czech Army abroad and foreign armies on the Czech territory.
In September 1995, after several discussions, the Czech Parliament passed a bill
that created the Czech Senate—an important constitutional legislative body that was
61
lacking. Previously, in the event of a government collapse, the lower chamber of the
Parliament would have needed to be dissolved after the new Parliamentary elections, and
the absence of the Senate could have caused a constitutional crisis. This Senate is now
made up of eighty-one senators elected for six-year terms. Every two years one-third of
the Senate's seats come up for re-election. According to the Czech Republic's
constitution, the Senate cannot be dissolved. The Chamber of Deputies is made up of 200
deputies elected for a term of four years (the last election took place in June 1998). The
President can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies in certain cases outlined in the
constitution.
Elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate take place by secret ballot on
the basis of general, equal, and direct voting. The Chamber of Deputies is elected on the
basis of proportional representation. Political parties must obtain five percent of the
popular vote in order to gain seats in the chamber. The Senate is elected on the basis of a
majority vote.81
a) Government Foreign Policy Priority
Since the restoration of freedom in 1989 and the independence of the
Czech Republic on January 1, 1993, the top priority of the Czech government's foreign
policy has been joining NATO, the European Union and the Western European Union.
Since 1993, each government has supported the strong Czech position on NATO and EU
8
'
"Constitution of the Czech Republic," 16 December 1992. Available [Online]: <http://fenrir.psp.cz/cgi-
bin/eng/docs/laws/constitution.html> [28 October 1998].
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integration. The strong point of view of the Czech Republic on NATO membership can
also be seen by the government's decision not to have a national referendum on the Czech
Republic's entrance into NATO which was supported by the second largest party, CSSD,
prior to the June 1998 Parliamentary elections.82 However, a clear message was sent
abroad after the Czech government, the Czech Parliament, and finally the Czech Senate
overwhelmingly voted for NATO membership on April 30, 1998. 83
b) Elections and Political Society
Since its independence in 1993, the Czech Republic "has experienced
considerably greater political stability" and developed a civil society superior to that of
Slovakia.84 The Czech government, with its Prime Minister Klaus, has continued with
market reforms and the privatization process promoted in the 1992 Czechoslovakian
elections, and all changes in political and social life have been subordinated to these
economic issues. During 1995 and 1996, several public corruption scandals relating to
the privatization process and secret financing of political parties emerged as a result of
gaps in the new economic laws. These events and little government interest in the
82 Michal Mocek, "Pro CSSD konci dlouhy pochod do naruce Alliance (A Long March to NATO's Arms for the
CSSD Ends)," Dries (8 October 1998), p. 10.
83
"Cesky Senat take hlasoval pro NATO (The Czech Senate Voted for NATO Too)," Lidove Noviny (2 May 1998), p.
1.
84 Carol Skalnik Leff, "Political and National Identity in the Czech and Slovak Republics," The Czech and Slovak
Republics: Nation Versus State (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 157.
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military reforms caused voters to be skeptical of the government coalition, and the ODS,
the strongest party in the country.
In the 1996 Czech Republic's first independent Parliamentary elections,
only six of twenty registered parties and movements obtained five percent or more of the
popular vote (Table Dl-2). The three strongest government coalition parties (ODS, KDU-
CSL, ODA) obtained ninety-nine mandates in the Chamber of Deputies and fifty-two
mandates in the Senate. This means that the former coalition narrowly lost its
Parliamentary majority. The government was center-and right-oriented and tried to finish
the transformation process of the Czech Republic. Vaclav Klaus, chairman of the ODS,
was reelected as Prime minister.
Table III-2 Elections to the Czech Parliament, May 31 -
June 1, 1996
Czech Parliament (200 seats)
Major Political Parties percent of Votes number of Seats
ODS (Civic Democratic Party)
CSSD (Social Democratic Party)
KSCM (Communists)
KDU (Christian Democratic Union)
ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance)
SPR-RSC (Republican Party)
Source: "Czech Election Results." Facts on File World News Digest, 6 August 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]:
EUROPE/ALLNWS [9 November 1998], p. 1. And "Ruling Coalition Loses Majority." Facts on File World News








In December 1997, the government was forced to resign when the
coalition disintegrated. This was caused mainly by the long-term disagreements within
the coalition parties, several financial scandals, and the worsening economic performance
of the Czech Republic.
In January 1998, the new temporary government of Prime Minister Jozef
Tosovsky, former head of the Czech National Bank, whose primary task was to prepare
the country for the early Parliamentary elections in June 1998, was appointed by President
Havel. In the June 1998 Parliamentary elections, the Czech Social Democratic Party
(CSSD) gained the majority of votes (32.3 percent) which gave it seventy-four of the 200
seats in Parliament. Table JJI-3 breaks down the percentage of votes received by each
party and the number of seats it secured:
Table III-3 Elections to the Czech Parliament, June 20 - 21, 1998
Czech Parliament (200 seats)
Major Political Parties percent of Votes number of Seats
CSSD (Social Democratic Party)
ODS (Civic Democratic Party)
KSCM (Communists)
KDU (Christian Democratic Union)
US (Freedom Union)
SPR-RSC (Republican Party)
DZJ (Pensioners for a Secure Life)
Source: "Czech Election Results." Facts on File World News Digest, 6 August 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]:









Although Milos Zeman, the chairman of CSSD, won the elections, he had
a more difficult situation than his predecessor, former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.
However, Zeman claimed the right to form the left-right government immediately after
the election and surprised many political experts who would not have predicted that the
left-wing party, CSSD, could ever agree with the right-wing party, OSD, before the
election. Zeman said, "This is a normal procedure in any democratic country, and we
want to be a democratic country."85 After a few weeks of negotiations and despite some
difficulties among all the parties to create a government coalition, Social Democrat leader
Zeman finally formed a minority government, called "a shadow government," following a
procedural opposition agreement with the conservative ODS (27.74 percent) which had
sixty-three seats in the Parliament. For the first time since 1989, a left-oriented
opposition Social Democratic party "won the Czech Republic's Parliamentary election
—
their first win for 78 years,"86 and ruled in the Czech Republic. Klaus and Zeman
exchanged their chairs when Zeman became new Prime Minister and Vaclav Klaus
became Chairman of the Parliament.
The left-right cabinet with its Social Democrat Prime Minister Zeman
accepted the market economy reforms and commitment to NATO and EU membership
but also promised to increase spending on social security, and to crack down on
85
"A Turn to the Left as Social Democrats Win Czech Election." Deustche Presse-Agentur. 20 June 1998. Available
[Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [20 June 1998], p. 1.
86
"Special Election Reports '98," 21 June 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://voskovec.radio.cz/elections98/election.html> [30 July 1998], p. 1,
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corruption and so-called "money laundering and tunneling," which had lately contributed
to the worsening Czech economic performance before NATO and EU membership.
c) A BriefEconomic Status and Goals
The Czech Republic, with its strategic central European geographic
locations and long borders with Germany and Austria, belongs among the most advanced
of the former Communist-bloc nations and the most attractive investment countries in
Central and Eastern Europe because of its minimal national debt, stable Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth, and the lowest levels of inflation and unemployment in Central
and Eastern Europe. After the division of the republic, the Czech economy started to
grow in 1994. In 1995 and 1996, the real GDP growth was between five and six percent
and the average inflation rate was between eight and nine percent. Signaling the
country's return to one of the world's most advanced economies, the Czech Republic
joined the Organization of Eastern and Central Development (OECD) on November 28,
1995, and was the first post-Communist country to receive an "A" rating from the
Moody's Investors' Service and Standard & Poor's. 87 Since 1996, after a rapid (both
small- and large-scale) Czech privatization, the Czech Republic set up a privatization
bank and adopted European economic laws. In 1997, according to the World Trade
°' "What Is the Investment Climate in the Czech Republic? - Czechlnvest." Mondaq Business Briefing, 23 July 1997.
Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 November 1998], p. 1.
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Organization (WTO), the Czech Republic was the twenty-eighth biggest exporter ($22.5
billion) and importer ($27 billion) in the world. 88
The top economic priority goal of the country is the EU membership. By a
decision of the European Commission in June 1998, the Czech Republic and five other
countries, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus were invited to begin
accession talks. The first concrete EU membership negotiations began on November 10,
1998. 89
d) The Basis ofDemocratic Contemporary Civil-Military Relations
The Czech Republic's possible integration into the military alliance of
NATO, the primary foreign policy goal, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993
significantly contributed to the expansion of a modern military, as well as an increase in
military prestige and civil-military relations.90
"The attitudes towards joining NATO reflected general political and
ideological polarization in the country," but debate about the NATO membership
88
"CR ve vyvozu i dovozu osmadvacata ve svetS (The Czech Republic in Exports and Imports Is 28th in the World),
Rude Prdvo, 2 November 1998, p. 19.
89
"Praha konecne vstoupila na prah Evropske Unie (Prague Finally Stepped on the Threshold of the European
Union)," Mladd Fronta Dries, 1 1 November 1998, p. 1.
90 In Czechoslovakia in the beginning of 1990, the military's low prestige had important consequences for
Czechoslovak civil-military relations and national security thinking. See Thomas S. Szayna and James B. Steinberg,
"The Prestige Problem," Civil-Military Relations and National Security Thinking in Czechoslovakia: A Conference
Report, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), pp. 7-11.
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improved and increased the interest of policymakers on the military issues. Also military
prestige with debate on NATO enlargement has improved.91
In contrast to Hungary, public support for NATO membership in the
Czech Republic was quite low in 1993 and in the beginning of 1994. President Clinton's
February 1994 visit to Prague, where he for the first time publicly spoke about a new PfP
(Partnership for Peace) program, increased public support for the Czech Republic to enter
NATO. In 1998, the Czech Republic's closer association with the West has positively
influenced the Czech's attitudes toward the military and continuing defense reforms.
This also increased public support for NATO. While, according to the Institute for
Research of Public Opinion Polls (IVVM), only forty-five to forty-seven percent of
Czechs supported the country's entry in April and June of 1997, by November 1998, it
had risen to fifty-seven percent—the national record since 1991.92
The constitution of the Czech Republic, which became valid on the day of
the birth of the new state, explicitly defined civil rights, the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches of power, the independence of the judiciary, and
further created basic conditions for effective civilian control of the military.
91 Marie Vlachova and Stefan Sarvas, "From the Totalitarian to the Post-Totalitarian Military," in Anton A. Bebler,
ed., Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, (Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 99.
9? '*z
"Cabinet to Blame for Low Public Support for NATO - Zantovsky." CTK National News Wire, 23 June 1997.
Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1 . And "Podpora rozsireni NATO vzrusta
(Support for NATO Enlargement Grows Up)," Lidove Noviny, 10 November 1998, p. 1
.
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According to excerpts from the declaration of governmental policy, "The
government is aware of the fact that the base of defense is its trustworthiness and, above
all, a clearly defined willingness to defend the country. The defense of the country is not
merely an issue concerning its armed forces but also the whole society and each
individual citizen.... The government is prepared to pay utmost attention to the
completion of the transformation process of our army and the modernization of its
technology, to achieve compatibility between the Army of the Czech Republic and NATO
armed forces."93
Even though the civilian and military chain of command has gone through
several broad reorganization and personnel changes since 1993, as Table ITI-4 shows
below, the process of transformation is not completed yet; and the further, no less
complicated phase of entering NATO and building a modem army for the Czech
Republic, including "maximum communication between the army and society regarding
defense issues, completion of the transformation process, acquisition of important
weapons, and preparation of the army for NATO membership," still lies ahead.94
93
"Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic." (Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, AVIS, Nase
Vojsko, 1997), p. 1.
9 Simon, Jeffrey, "The Czech Republic: Advancing toward Democracy," NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A
Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
niversity, 1996), pp. 237-238.
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Table III-4 THE RULERS OF THE DEFENSE REFORMS AND CIVIL
MILITARY RELATIONS FROM 1993 TO 1998
President of the Czech Republic
Vaclav Havel 1/1993 - present
Prime Ministers
Vaclav Klaus 1/1993 - 1 1/1997
Josef Tosovsky 12/1997- 7/1998
Milos Zeman 7/1998 - present
Ministers of Defense
Antonin Baudys 1/1993- 9/1994
VilemHolan 9/1994- 7/1996
Miloslav Vybomy 7/1996- 1/1998
Michal Lobkowicz 1/1998- 7/1998
Vladimir Vetchy 7/1998 - present
Chiefs of Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic
General Colonel Jiff Nekvasil " 7/1993 - 5/1998
Lt. General Jin Sedivy 5/1998 - present
According to this table, since 1993, during a five-year period, there have
been five Ministries of Defense. Taking over the office, each of them selected his own
staff and it took a while to familiarize this staff with the current military issues. Except
for expressing the same opinion on NATO enlargement, every minister had his own
concept for reorganizing the military. Unfortunately, by the time each minister started to
implement some of his military reorganization plans, it was time to leave the office.
However, after the Parliamentary election in June 1998, Vladimir Vetchy,
former head of the Social Democrat (CSSD) defense commission, who became a new
Defense Minister in the government of CSSD leader Milos Zeman, stated that:
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The Czech Republic [is] lacking the necessary legislation to build its
defense, and therefore it must pass laws on civic defense, the army, army
administration offices, career soldiers, military and alternative services,
army exercises, reservist soldiers, and on foreign armed forces on the
territory of the Czech Republic and Czech armed forces abroad. The
existing legislation comes from the 1960s and even from the 1940s.95
Vladimir Vetchy seems to be the only Minister of Defense whose priority
goal is the personnel and social issue of the military, one of the most required tasks for
the Czech Republic's integration to NATO. After his first visit to Washington in
September 1998, where he met William Cohen, the US Secretary of Defense, and his
assistant Franklin Kramer, Vetchy said that American representatives of the Pentagon,
during their discussion with the Czech delegation on the current situation in the Czech
military, were mostly interested in working and social conditions for soldiers.96 To
implement successfully better working and social conditions for Czech soldiers would
mean to cut the number of military personnel.
In response to using the military's financial resources efficiently, Vetchy
"did not expect the planned professionalization of the army to cut defense costs, but that
it would only make it possible to cut the number of soldiers."97
95
"Defense Minister Supports NATO Membership." 22 July 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.ctknews.com/archiv/vetchydoc.htm> [28 August 1998], p. 1.
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Jiri Roskot, "Vetchy: Americany nejvi'c zajfma pracovni a socialnf zazemi vojaku (Vetchy: Americans Are Mostly
Interesting in Working and Social Conditions for Soldiers)." 21 September 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.trafika.cz/rp/1998/980921/rp050703.html > [22 September 1998], p. 1.
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' "Defense Minister Supports NATO Membership." 22 July 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.ctknews.com/archiv/vetchydoc.htm> [28 August 1998], p. 1.
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(1) The State Budget of the Defense Department. In a
democratic society, the state budget of the Ministry of Defense becomes a significant tool
in controlling the military. In the Czech Republic, the new US accounting system—the
Programming Planing Budgeting System (PPBS), which has been successfully
implemented into the defense department—helps this process and enables it to define the
real costs of every single military unit.
Although the government passed "the medium term
conception which assumes that till 2000 it will increase the rate of military expenditure in
GDP by 0.1% annually (Table III-5),"98 the proposed modernization programs are very
costly, especially modernizing the air force, and cannot be financed from the defense
budget.
Table III-5 Czech Military Expenditure Rate from 1995 through 1998
YEAR EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE RATE OF MOD





Source: Source: "Introduction," Budget - Facts and Trends '98 (Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic,
AVIS, Lizard Prague Ltd., 1998), p. 1 1.
9*
"Introduction," Budget - Facts and Trends '98 (Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, AVIS, Lizard
Prague Ltd., 1998), pp. 5-7.
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This increase means that the military expenditure rate in
the Gross Domestic Product in the year 2000 will be approximately 2% (41.4 billion
Czechs Crowns, approximately $1.4 billion).
(2) Limitations on Civil-Military Relations. Among
other factors, there have been three serious limitations to further development of the army
and civil-military relations such as:
a) Personnel and Social Issues:
Many young lower-ranking officers left the army because they lost their
motivation to stay any longer in a military that was unable to provide them with basic
benefits, such as housing for their families. Also many civilian companies offered at least
double the salary that the military could afford to pay for very well-educated young
officers. Further, a disproportion between NCO officers and upper-ranking officers
causes no less of a problem in the military service, where the so-called career pyramid in
the Czech Republic Army is still "upside-down" (far more Lt. Colonels and Colonels than
non-commissioned officers [NCOs]). To illustrate, according to the 1997 Ministry of
Defense Year-book, as of December 31, 1997, of the 23, 759 professional soldiers in the
Czech Republic Army, there were 15,341 officers (3,401 Lt. Colonels and 660 Colonels),
7,196 warrant officers and 1,203 NCOs;99
9
"Personnel Management and Education," 1997 Ministry ofDefense Year-book (Prague: Ministry of Defense
AVIS, 1998), p. 58.
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b) Acquisition Problems of the Czech Army Modernization
Contracts Procedures:
This includes announced public tenders for military equipment and
services, which were not transparent (missing public competitions), and in several cases
were manipulated by members of the commission; and
c) Insufficient Financial Resources for Costly Strategic
Modernization Programs:
For instance, modernizing the air force by purchasing at least two
squadrons of modern supersonic aircraft was an enormous burden. The decision to
modernize the air force was submitted to the government in 1997, but nothing has been
done yet. Such decisions that must be made by the government have been postponed
several times because of political changes (i.e. the dissolution of the government coalition
in 1997 and the Parliamentary election in 1998).
Despite some of these limitations, before the Czech Republic's entry into
NATO, it had been working intensively to meet NATO requirements—the fifty-two Task
Force Goals. According to Jeffrey Simon, the Czech Republic "has made enormous
progress on the road to achieving democratic control over the military." 10° As Figure III-
2 shows below, the Czech Republic with its new Committee for NATO Integration (VIN)
and its State Security Council (BRS) already has "effective" civilian control over the
military. The BRS consists of two committees, the Committee for Defense Planing
*"" Simon, Jeffrey, "Prologue as Future: What Central Europe Needs to Do," NATO Enlargement & Central Europe:
A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, 1996), p. 309.
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(VPOP) and the Committee for Crisis Management (VPKM). The VPOP is maintained
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and the VPKM under the Ministry of
Interior. 101 A successful completion of the accession talks between the Czech Republic
and NATO in 1997, and the further qualitative changes in the Armed Forces in the
direction of NATO standards has demonstrated the effective civilian control of the
military.
101
"Usnesenf Vlady Ceske Republiky ze dne 10. cervna 1998 c. 391 o Bezpecnostni rade statu a o planovanf opatfeni
k zajisteni bezpecnosti Ceske republiky (Decision of the Government of the Czech Republic from June 10, 1998. no.
391, on State Security Council and Planning Measures to Secure the Czech Republic Security)," 10 June 1998.
Available [Online]: <http://www.vlada.cz/cgi-bin/sqwfASC.cgi/sqw/usnvlad/usntext.sqw?CID=6950> [10 November
1998], p. 1-2.
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D. THE FATE OF DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA AFTER 1993
With an area of 49,006 square kilometers and a population of 5.45 million,
Slovakia, like the Czech Republic, is located in Central Europe (Figure III-3). Poland
borders it to the North, Ukraine to the east, Hungary to the south, and Austria and the












Figure III-3 A Map of the Slovak Republic in 1998
Source: "Map of the Slovak Republic." 6 February 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.eubusiness.com/slovakia/slovakia.jpg> [28 October 1998].
Since the establishment of the Slovak Republic on January 1, 1993, Slovakia has
continued the difficult transformation from a rather centrally-controlled political system
and economy to a stable democracy and modern market-oriented economy. With its
stateness problems and weaknesses in democracy and a market economy, Slovakia has
moved out of the first wave among post-Communistic Central and Eastern European
states and was excluded from negotiation for accession with NATO and EU. While
Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia are being mentioned as "hot" candidates for the next
round of NATO enlargement, Slovakia, at the Madrid NATO summit in July 1997 and
during the last Slovak Parliamentary September 1998 election, was not even mentioned as
a possible candidate for the future NATO enlargement.
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1. Slovakia's Political System and Foreign Policy
Slovakia, in contrast to the Czech Republic and other Central European states, is
the only state that "really had to build its institutions from scratch because of its long
history as part of Czechoslovakia with a government based in Prague." 102 The Slovak
National Council passed the Slovak Constitution on September 1, 1992, by the necessary
three-fifths majority.
The President of Slovakia is the head of the state and commander-in-chief. The
President is elected to office, and may be recalled, by the Parliament by a three-fifths
majority of all its members. In contrast to the Czech Republic, after the Slovakia's 1998
election, based on the coalition agreement, a new government decided to have a direct
election of the President. 103 The same person can be elected President for a maximum of
two consecutive five-year electoral terms. The President of Slovakia has limited powers.
For example, in case of a crisis, the president does not have the right to dissolve
Parliament and call new elections. In Slovakia, dissolving Parliament depends on the will
of the deputies and a three-fifths majority of votes in Parliament is needed for this
decision.
1U^ Jeffrey Simon, "Slovakia: Instability and Special Problems," NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in
Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
1996), p. 253.
1U3
"Prezidenta SR budu volit' obcania pnamo, spolocnym koalicnym kandidatom je R. Schuster (Citizens Will Elect
President of Slovakia Directly; Common Coalition Candidate is R. Schuster)." 5 November 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.sme.sk/aarticle.asp?dat=447&id=65159> [6 November 1998], p. 1.
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The government of Slovakia is the supreme body for exercising executive power.
It consists of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, and Ministers. The
government is formed on the basis of Parliamentary elections. The Prime Minister is
appointed and removed by the President of the Slovak Republic. Upon the advice of the
Prime Minister, the President appoints and removes other member of the government.
The National Council of the Slovak Republic is a unicameral Parliament, and
under the Constitution is the supreme body exercising legislative power in the Slovak
Republic. The National Council has 150 members elected for four-year terms in direct
elections with secret ballots. Like the Czech Republic, at least five percent of the total
vote is needed for a party to enter Parliament. Parties are allocated seats in the Parliament
according to the percentage of votes they get in the Parliamentary elections. The
Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic is elected or recalled by secret
ballot with the consent of an absolute majority of all members of the Parliament. 104
a) Government Foreign Policy Priority
Likewise in the Czech Republic, since the restoration of freedom in 1989
and the independence of the Slovak Republic on January 1, 1993, the integration into the
Western European and Transatlantic organizations, such as the EU, NATO and the WEU
has been the top foreign policy priority of the Slovak government. Even though these
integration efforts are supported by the majority of the Slovak population and political
104
.^g Constitutional of the Slovak Republic." 3 September 1992. Available [Online]:
<http://www.tuzvo.sk/court/c-file.html> [17 September 1998].
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parties, "Slovakia fell from the first tier of candidates for NATO and EU membership
after both organizations repeatedly expressed concerns about the quality of the country's
democracy." 105
b) Slovakia's Election and Political Society
Since 1994, in the Slovak Republic great political instability has resulted
due to Meciar's authoritarian activities, bordering on a dictatorship, which Slovaks and
political scientists call "Meciarism."
In February 1993, Michal Kovac was elected president of the country, and
in spite of being a fellow member of the HZDS party, Kovac was not a Meciar ally. Soon
this led to many conflicts within the government. Meciar's position was further
undermined by the resignation and defection of a number of party deputies in early 1994.
In March 1994, Meciar resigned from office after receiving a vote of "no confidence"
from the Slovak Parliament, because he could not get enough support for his privatization
policies. An interim coalition government comprising representatives from a broad range
of parties was sworn in, with Jozef Moravcik of the Democratic Union of the Slovakia
Party as Prime Minister. 106 Moravcik's government revived the privatization process and
took steps to attract more foreign investment to Slovakia. This also helped to calm the
increasingly strained relations between Slovaks and resident Hungarians, who had begun
105
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Republics: Nation Versus State (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1997), pp. 149-150.
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campaigning for educational and cultural autonomy. In May 1994. Parliament passed a
law that allowed ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia to register their names in their original
form. This replaced previous legislation, for which Slovaks were criticized, requiring
Hungarians to convert their names to the Slavic form.
When Prime Minister Moravcik assessed his first hundred days in the
Slovak government in his speech during a press conference, he stated that "the positive
results of the Parliamentary democracy in Slovakia are proof that this system is the best
option for Slovakia." He also thought that the next government to be elected in the fall
Parliamentary election "should perpetuate the democratic principles and support
cooperation between Slovakia and foreign countries." 107 However, this hope was far
removed from reality.
In the elections held in the fall of 1994, only seven of eighteen registered
parties, movements, and coalitions obtained five percent or more of the popular vote. 108
The HZDS Party, led once again by Meciar, received 34.6 percent of the popular vote and
although almost all the parties refused to form a coalition with Meciar, the HZDS
announced its plans to form a government with the support of the ultra-nationalist Slovak
National Party. 109 The two parties did not control enough Parliamentary seats (only 70 of
107
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150) to command a majority (Table UI-6); however, this situation was resolved in
November 1994, when the left-wing Association of Slovak Workers joined Meciar's
coalition, which became the majority with a total of eighty-three seats in the Parliament.
Table III-6 Elections to the Slovak National Council, October 2, 1994
Slovak National Council (150 seats)
Major Political Parties percent of Votes number of Seats
HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia) 34.60 61
SV (Common Choice) - a coalition formed of the Party
of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Social Democratic
Party of Slovakia (SDSS), the Green Party (SZS)
and the Farmers Movement (HP) 1 0.4
1
18
MK (Hungarian Coalition) - a coalition consisted
of Hungarian ethnic parties: Spoluzitie, Hungarian
Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), and
Hungarian Civic Party (MOS) 10.18 17
KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) 10.08 17
DU (Democratic Union) 8.57 15
ZRS (Association of Workers of Slovakia) 7.34 13
SNS (Slovak National Party) 5.40 9
Source: "Major Political Parties and Their Performance in the Last Parliamentary Elections Held on October 2, 1994."
31 August 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.slovakemb.com/general.shtml> [31 August 1998], p. 6.
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The new government took office in December 1994, and Meciar became
Prime Minister for a third time. In an effort to reverse Moravcik's liberalization policies,
the Meciar government returned radio and television communications to state control and
blocked the privatization of state-owned companies. As Peter Finn wrote for the
Washington Post Foreign Service, "Meciar and his party, the Movement for Democratic
Slovakia, were accused of politicizing all aspects of Slovak society, muzzling
independent media, enriching party cronies and undermining the constitution." 110 These
and other measures aimed at centralizing power in Meciar's hands alarmed a number of
Western governments.
In the months that followed, tensions mounted between Meciar's
government and President Kovac because Meciar did not forgive Kovac for his role in the
dismissal of his government in March 1994. This long-lasting dispute between Meciar
and Kovac did not contribute to political stabilization. On May 5, 1995, the Slovak
National Council passed a vote of no-confidence in Kovac over his alleged failure to
control the activities of the Slovak Information Service, the intelligence agency that had
been transferred from Kovac 's authority to that of the government. Kovac declared the
vote, which had no legal consequence, unconstitutional (it fell ten votes short of the
110 Ibid.
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number required to depose the president). Later he said, "nobody and nothing will break
me." 1 11
In November 1995, Meciar's government was criticized for passing a new
law that reaffirmed that Slovak was the nation's only official language and limited the
official use of Hungarian and other languages.
The situation among Slovakia's politicians became even worse after
Michal Kovac Jr., the son of President Michal Kovac, was kidnapped from Slovakia by
unknown malefactors in the beginning of September 1995. Michal Kovac Jr. was
smuggled into Austria where he was freed and then arrested on an international warrant
based on a German fraud case in which he was involved. Slovakia's secret intelligence
service (SIS), headed by Meciar's close friend, Ivan Lexa, was suspected of involvement
in the abduction of Kovac Jr. and other violations of the law. The abduction has not been
solved yet. According to Jane Perlez's article, "Abduction Casts New Doubts on
Slovakia," published in The New York Times, "Almost immediately, two Slovak police
investigators said they had linked the incident to the country's intelligence service. This
fed suspicion that Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar had arranged the kidnapping to
embarrass his chief political rival, President Michal Kovac.... The new American
Ambassador to Slovakia, Ralph R. Johnson, said that if the country wanted to join
1
' 1
"Slovakia: May 1998," Hilfe Country Report, May 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10
November 1998], p. 8.
85
Western democratic organizations, the kidnapping of Mr. Kovac . . . and the killing of the
witness, Robert Remias, needed to be 'pursued with determination.
"
,J 12
In December 1996, another manipulation of Slovakia's constitution
occurred, when Frantisek Gaulieder, only a month after he had left the HZDS, was
deprived of his Parliamentary seat. The Slovak Constitutional Court declared that
dismissing Gaulieder from the Parliament was illegal, but Parliament did not overturn the
decision and did not return Gaulieder to his Parliamentary post.
In May 1997, the Interior Minister Gustav Krajci deleted the fourth ballot
question from the nationwide referendum. This deletion enabled a change in the way
presidents were elected. As this concerned the country's entrance into NATO, the
government declared the referendum invalid due to poor voter turnout (only ten percent
of eligible voters participated in the referendum). 113
During 1997 and 1998, NATO, the EU and other international organizations and
Western governments strongly criticized Meciar's administration for its questionable
commitment to democracy, and the rule of law, and for its human rights record. For
example, the U.S. Ambassador Ralph Johnson, in his July 14, 1998, speech, criticized
Slovakia for the lack of tolerance, absence of the rule of law, and Slovakia's trend toward
1 '- Jane Perlez, "Abduction Casts New Doubts on Slovakia Chief," The New York Times, 17 December 1996.
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centralization of power over day-to-day life in Slovakia. 114 In response to Johnson's
criticism, Meciar compared Johnson with Stephan Chervonenko, the Soviet Ambassador
to Prague during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and "claimed that he
was feeding the U.S. State Department with lies about Slovakia." 1 15
However, Slovakia did not take any action to correct the failings that
Johnson referred to, and after President Kovac's term expired on March 2, 1998, the
country was plunged into a constitutional crisis. According to the Slovak Constitution,
the government became an enormously powerful administrative body with greater
powers. For instance, on March 4, 1998, Meciar granted amnesty to people involved in
the kidnapping of former President Michal Kovac's son in 1995, put a stop to legal action
regarding the thwarting of the referendum in 1997, and also recalled at least twenty-nine
ambassadors. 116 "The EU statement called the failed referendum and the 1995
kidnapping of Kovac Jr. 'factors in the [European] commission's assessment that
Slovakia did not meet the ... criteria' for EU membership." 117
114 Ralph Johnson, "Door to NATO Will Open to Slovakia in Future," Amb. Johnson Remarks 7/14 On U.S. -Slovakia
Relations. 16 July 1997. Available [Online]: <http://pes.eunet.cz/97/29/0029arl7.htm> [26 May 1998], pp. 1-2.
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In May 1998, Meciar's ruling coalition approved a controversial new
election law, declaring that if a member of the coalition failed to cross the Parliamentary
threshold of at least five percent of popular votes, the rest of the coalition parties would
be viewed as if they registered for the election on their own. This means that if these
small parties, coalition partners, failed to get five percent of the vote, they would be
excluded from Parliament, and their seats would be divided among the winning parties.
Meciar's government received far-ranging criticism for this unpopular decision. For
example, on June 22, 1998, U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin said,
The new election law approved by the Slovak Parliament in May fails to
meet international standards and should be changed.... In its current form,
the law could result in "unfree and unfair elections," not least because it
increases the authority of the Interior Ministry, which disrupted polling in
two referendums last year. 1 18
Western democracies also viewed a new amendment of the election law as
antidemocratic. This amendment forbade any independent media from broadcasting any
information or political news thirty days prior to the election; however, state television
and radio stations could broadcast without limitation, except for the last forty-eight hours
before elections. In response to the new election law, Andfej Hryc, director of the
independent radio station Radio Twist, said, "I have to censure all news personally
although it is forbidden by the constitution." This meant that Meciar and his HZDS to
118 Dennis Moran, "Slovak Brief." 1 July 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.praguepost.cz/archive/slov70198a.html> [10 November 1998], p. 1.
their benefit actually controlled all of Slovakia's independent media. 1 19 In August 1998,
Meciar's effort to control the media led to the suspicion of HZDS and SIS involvement in
politicizing the privately-owned TV station, Markiza, an ownership dispute that later
became a symbol of freedom and democracy in Slovakia. 120 The last attempt of the
HZDS government to prevent the Slovak Democratic Coalition from participating in the
elections was also considered against the law in a democratic state. In August 1998, the
HZDS protested to the Slovakian Supreme Court against registrating its only rival, the
SDK. According to the HZDS, the SDK was not a standard political party but a coalition
of five parties and could not register for the elections. However, according to the
Supreme Court, the fact that the SDK was not a standard political party did not mean that
it could not be registered. To exclude the HZDS's strongest opponent from the
September 1998 elections would have meant a complete end of democracy in
Slovakia. 121 According to the British Helsinki Human Rights Group's election-
procedures report, senators D'Amato and Smith of the US Congress Helsinki Committee
stated on October 2, 1998, that "Vladimir Meciar's regime expediently sought to provoke
1 19 Karel Wolf, "Nezavisla slovenska media musf mlcet (Slovak Independent Media Must Be Silent)," 3 September
1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/980903/mf63857818.html> [3 September 1998], p. 1. And
Daniela Bartosova, "Televize na Slovensku je zpolitizovana (Television in Slovakia is Politicized)," 7 September 1998.
Available [Online]: <http://www.trafika.cz/ln/1998/980907/ln68762684.html> [8 September 1998], p. 1.
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chaos and disorder in the pre-election period and create an atmosphere of insecurity,
instability and tension." 122
However, in the 1998 elections, only six of seventeen registered parties,
movements and coalitions obtained five percent or more of the popular vote. 123 An
opposition of four parties and coalitions, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the
Party of the Democratic Left (SDE), the Slovak Hungarian Coalition (SMK), and the
Party of Civic Understanding (SOP)--winning ninety-three seats in the 150-seat Slovak
National Council—agreed that none of them would enter into negotiations with Premier
Meciar's HZDS, which emerged as the single largest party in Parliament, winning only
forty-three seats (Table ffl-8). 124
The HZDS as a Parliamentary winner lost a chance to form a new
government and became a government opposition. One of many factors in Meciar's
defeat was the failure of the Slovak Worker's Party (ZRS), one of the HZDS coalition
partners, which did not reach the threshold of five percent of popular votes needed to re-
enter the Parliament. The ZRS received only 1.3 percent of the vote. The opposition of
four parties became a government coalition and formed a new cabinet with more than
1 991ZZ
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three-fifths of the 150 seats in Parliament, allowing it to pass all bills and elect a
president.
Table III-8 Elections to the Slovak National Council, September 24 and 25, 1998
Slovak National Council (150 seats)
Major Political Parties percent of Votes number of Seats
HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia) 27.0 43
SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition) 26.33 42
SDE (the Slovak Communist Party)
SMK (Slovak Hungarian Coalition)
SNS (Slovak National Party)
SOP (Party of Civic Understanding)
Source: "SME Online: Politici deklaraju volu splnitzelania volicou (Politicians Declared Their Wiliness to Fulfill
Voters' Wishes)." 28 September 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.sme.sk/article.asp?id=60740> [28 September
1998], p. 1.
After the results of the elections were released Dzurinda said, "The vote
was a new hope for Slovakia." Together with other opposition parties he wanted to return
a "democratic face to Slovakia." 125 Meciar, hiring internationally famous artists and
models, such as German model Claudia Schiffer, French actors Jean-Paul Belmondo, Jr.,
and Gerard Depardieu, and Italian star Claudia Cardinale, for his HZDS's campaign






"Mikulas Dzurinda Likely to Succeed Meciar as Slovak Premier," CTK National News Wire, 28 September 1 998.
Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.
91
gain the two-third majority of votes in the Parliament needed to form a new government,
and he was defeated by the opposition and left the political scene. During an interview on
Slovak Television, STV, Meciar conceded defeat by singing, "Farewell, I leave you. I
never hurt, I never hurt any of you." Not able to hand over the Prime Minster office
personally to his successor Mikulas Dzurinda (former Transport Minister in Jozef
Moravcik's 1994 cabinet), and leaving no money in the government coffers to run many
ministries, Meciar declared he was not interested in any political position including the
presidential post. Meciar gave up his deputy's mandate to his ally Ivan Lexa (of the
HZDS) and former Chief of the Slovak Intelligence Agency (SIS), and "disappeared"
from the political scene. After four years, the era of Mecarism, Meciar' s political and
economic path, "during which Slovakia was repeatedly censured by the United States and
EU countries for abuses of democracy," 126 ended in Slovakia.
As Milan Galanda, Slovak attorney, said, "there is a chance ahead for us to
begin to build up a tradition based on tolerance of opponents and enable opposition to
share not only the control of power but also the control of public affairs so they will take
responsibility for the country and its citizens." 127
126 Siegfried Mortkowitz, "Goodbye to Meciarism." The Prague Post, 30 September 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]:
EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.
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c) A BriefEconomic Status and Goals
During Czechoslovak statehood, the Slovak economy was more agrarian
and less developed than its Czech counterpart. Under the Communist regime in
Czechoslovakia, the Communists leadership decided to build up agrarian Slovakia by
locating heavy industries there that were mostly dependent on Russian oil and gas. These
different economic outlooks, compounded by Prague's centralized governmental control,
produced discontent among Slovaks regarding the future structure of the new democratic
state.
After 1989, during the economic transformation to a market economy,
Prague made many important decisions which were unpopular to Slovaks, due to the
increasing unemployment rate which soared three times higher than in the Czech lands.
Slovaks soon became increasingly uncomfortable with their role in the new, independent
country and, as I mentioned earlier, the Slovaks did not agree with the Czechs' proposed
rapid transition to a market economy. In 1997 unemployment was 12.5 percent, and for
1998 was estimated between 1 1.8 and 2.3 percent. 128
Under Meciar's leadership and his economic policy, the process of
privatization slowed in Slovakia. However, after the completion of several large
investment projects, such as the Mochovce nuclear power plant and the Slovnaft refining
firm, and having attracted sufficient foreign loans for investment, the Slovak economy
1 7R1Z,° Ron Orol and Peter Smith, "Slovakia on an Economic Precipice." 30 September 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.praguepost.cz/busi93098b.html> [3 October 1998]. p. 1.
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has experienced several years of exuberant GDP growth and a low inflation level of five
to six percent in 1996 and 1997. Also, the GDP grew 6.2 percent annually. 129
Like the Czech Republic, the top economic priority of Slovakia is the EU
membership. Slovakia is also making an effort to become a member of the Organization
of Eastern and Central Development (OECD). But, despite quite a fast growing economy
in 1996 and 1997, Slovakia because of its political instability has been relegated to the
second rank of countries seeking EU and OECD membership. In the next few months,
Slovakia will have to face a difficult economic situation, a legacy of Meciar's cabinet,
which left no money to run the government. According to a Slovak National Bank (SNB)
announcement, "the government officially has no money left in its accounts. And, with
unemployment running near an all-time high of 14.1 percent and Slovakia's current
account deficit of 1.1 billion Sk ($30 million), or roughly eleven percent of the gross
domestic product (GDP), drastic measures will be required to rescue the economy." 130
d) The Basis of Contemporary Democratic Civil-Military Relations
As I also pointed out earlier, as with the Czech Republic, Slovakia's top
foreign policy goals since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 has been integration
into NATO. This is also a basic step for accelerating the building of a modern military
and improving civil-military relations.
1-9
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Slovakia's military prestige in the public's eyes, the defense reforms, and
the transformation of the Slovak Armed Forces were considered rather successful for
NATO integration, but political instability has limited the civilian control over the
military. Exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of NATO enlargement and the
attempt to politicize the Slovak Armed Forces (SAR) by Meciar, Ivan Gasparovic,
Chairman of National Council, and Jozef Gajdos, State Secretary of Defense, brought
further negative developments in civil-military relations.
(1) The State Budget of Slovakia's Defense
Department. As in the Czech Republic, the new accounting system, PPBS (Programming
Planning Budgeting System), has been successfully implemented in the Slovakian
defense department, and the state budget of the Ministry of Defense has become a
significant tool in controlling the military.
However, in 1997, Meciar's inefficient allocation of
resources for bolstering the military led former Chief of General Staff Gen. Col. Tuchyfia
to prepare a request for early retirement, protesting the inadequate financial resources
allocated to the military to achieve its training goals and maintain combat readiness. 131
According to a U.S. expert team, the Army of the Slovak Republic needs seventeen
milliards of Slovak crowns annually for its basic performance. The following data (Table
131
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III-9) summarize developments of the State Budget of the Defense Department from 1995
to 1998 (in mid Sk).
Table III-9 Slovakian Military Expenditure Rate from 1995 through 1998
YEAR EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE RATE OF MOD





Source: "Vyvoj rozpoctu Ministerstva obrany SR v rokoch 1995-1998 (Development of the State Budget of the
Defense Department of the Slovak Republic from 1995 to 1998)." Dennik SME, (16 September 1998), Section: Tema
Dna. p. 1.
(2) Limitations on Civil-Military Relations: Politicizing
the Slovak Military. Even if one argued that Slovakia's defense reforms and military
transformation were successful enough for NATO integration, the military image and
civilian control of the military were not. Similarly to the Czech Republic, Slovakia went
through several organizational and personnel changes, (Table HI- 10) which did not
always contribute to an effective transformation.
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Table 111-10 THE RULERS OF THE DEFENSE REFORMS AND CIVIL
MILITARY RELATIONS FROM 1993 TO 1998
President of the Slovak Republic
MichalKovac 1/1993- 3/1998
Vacancy 3/1998 - present
Prime Ministers
Vladimir Meciar 1/1993- 3/1994
Josef Moravcik 3/ 1 994 - 1 2/ 1 994
Vladimir Meciar 1 2/ 1 994 - 1 0/ 1 998
Mikulas Dzurinda 10/1998 - present
Ministers of Defense
Imrich Andrejcak 3/1993- 3/1994
Pavol Kanis 3/ 1 994 - 1 2/ 1 994
JanSitek 12/1994-10/1998
Pavol Kanis 10/1998 - present
Commander of the Army of the Slovak Republic
Lt. General Julius Humaj 1/1993- 9/1994
Chiefs of Staff of the Army of the Slovak Republic (since September 1, 1994)
General Colonel Jozef Tuchyfia 9/1994- 9/1998
General Major Marian Miklus 9/1998 - present
However, gaps in Slovakia's constitutional law regarding
the military are the most evident problems in the civilian sector controlling the military.
This recently resulted in Meciar' s administration politicizing the Armed Forces of the
Slovak Republic. According to the Slovak independent daily newspaper, SME, the
Slovak Armed Forces and the officers corps were highly disappointed during the third
Meciar government because the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic were among the
best prepared post-Communist countries seeking entry into the NATO alliance. Yet they
were excluded from NATO and also could garner little public respect.
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Slovakia's successful participation in PfP military
exercises such as Cooperative Nugget in the US, and several communication exercises
such as Combined Endeavor and Cooperative Banners 97 in Norway, and the PfP
exercise Cooperative Key 97 in Slovakia, certainly proved Slovak military preparedness
for NATO membership. Because of Meciar antidemocratic policy, Slovakia was not
invited into NATO and this caused great disillusionment among the military personnel. 132
Recently, another problem of government policy—an
attempt to politicize the military—characterized Meciar' s continuing unstable democracy
and civilian control over the military in Slovakia. The ongoing Slovakia constitutional
problem (no Slovak president since March 2, 1998) gave Meciar and Gasparovic a chance
to politicize the military during an absence of Minister of Defense J. Sitek, who at the end
of August 1998 was on vacation in Mexico. A primary example of such politicizing
happened when the Chairman of National Council Gasparovic (based on Prime Minister
Meciar and State Secretary Defense Gajdos's recommendation), removed the Chief of
General Staff (CGS), General Tuchyna. Then they named a new CGS, Colonel Marian
Miklus, a supporter of HZDS, and promoted him to General. Meciar's decision violated
the law because the change in the post of CGS, according to constitutional law, could be
made by the President or the Chairman of the National Council only when it was based
132
"HZDS Pred Volbami ovladlo vedenie armady (HZDS Have Gained Control of the Military Leadership)," 31
August 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www. sme.sk/aarticle.asp?dat=392&id=57707> [31 August 1998], p. I.
98
on the recommendation of the Minister of Defense. 133 The change in the post of the CGS
had already been discussed and announced by Minister Sitek before he left the country,
yet Minister Sitek had recommended General Vestenicky as a new CGS. Meciar,
however, supported Colonel Miklus. At that time, CGS General Tuchyna refused to hand
over the post of CGS until the Minister of Defense returned, and so Slovakia had two
CGS's for that period. After Minister Sitek returned, Meciar publicly stated that if
Minister Sitek- did not accept his proposed change in the post of CGS, he would be
recalled. In order not to deepen the political crisis before the upcoming election on
September 25 and 26, 1998, Minister Sitek accepted Meciar's proposal and named
General Miklus as the new Chief of Staff of the Slovak Armed Forces. 134
Wolf, Karol. "Meciarova vlada iidajne porusila platne zakony (Meciar*s Government Allegedly Violated Valid
Laws)," Dnes, (21 August 1998), p. 8.
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When democracy returned to Czechoslovakia in 1989, nobody could have
predicted that it would return for only two years. Now, after Czechoslovakia has split
into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it seems that the democracy shared
by the two different nations, the Czechs and Slovaks, split as well. Presently the Czech
Republic seems to have a stable, consolidated democracy; Slovakia does not. Before
NATO's foreign ministers in Brussels on December 16, 1997, Jeffrey Simon, a leading
expert in Central and Eastern Europe Affairs from the U.S. National Defense University
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Institute for National Strategic Studies, said, "the Czech Republic was functioning as a
healthy democracy." 135 At that time, the situation in Slovakia was completely different.
Meciar's intolerance toward people with opposing opinions and his increasing
centralization of power led to Slovakia's exclusion from the first wave of NATO
enlargement and the first round of European Union entry negotiations. However, this has
prompted five Slovak opposition parties, concerned about their country's increasing
international isolation, to unite their forces to oppose Prime Minister Meciar and his
Meciarism. After the U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia, Ralph Johnson, explained why the
US could not support Slovakia's NATO membership, Meciar said, "The USA was
conducting destructive activities towards Slovakia through its Ambassador." 136 Meciar's
policy continued, and it was clear that while he governed, Slovakia would never join
NATO and the EU. This led an opposition bloc of five parties, the Slovak Democratic
Coalition (SDK), to criticize publicly a government that did not take all the international
concerns about Slovakia's democracy seriously:
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Jozef Sestak. state secretary at the Slovak Foreign Ministry, misleads
Slovak citizens when he blames the alleged double standards of the West
for Slovakia's failure in the integration process. The government has
failed completely in pursuing the issue of integration with Euro-Atlantic
structures. Slovakia has been excluded from NATO expansion because of
the government's arrogant methods of ruling and its unwillingness to
respect democratic principles. Therefore, Slovakia has found itself in the
second group of the countries to be integrated into EU. The government
has not been able to fulfill the pledges made in its policy statement." 137
Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley's interpretation of Juan J.
Linz's theories can help us understand our findings when comparing and evaluating
democracy in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As Linz pointed out, a political system
can be considered as democratic when:
it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of
basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the
purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals
by non-violent means their claim to rule... without excluding any. effective
political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the
political community from expressing their preference. 138
According to this definition, to compare the Czech and Slovak Republic, while
the Czech political scene has been healthy and competitive, Slovakia's government under
Meciar's administration has not respected the role of the other political institutions and
has treated the opposition as an enemy. Also, the Czech Republic can be viewed as a
13
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consolidated Parliamentary democracy with a fully-implemented rule of law, human
rights, and freedom of the press. The June 1998 Parliamentary election in the Czech
Republic also plainly showed government tolerance of other Parliamentary parties (left-
right government).
In their introduction on elite transformations and democratic regimes, in Elites
and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, scholars Michael
Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley distinctly describe an "unconsolidated
democracy." They write:
Where there is no reai elite consensus about democratic rules of the game
and institutions, and where elites are instead disunified in the sense that
they distrust and have little traffic with one another, we may speak of
an unconsolidated democracy.... What principally distinguishes unconso-
lidated from consolidated democracies is, in short, the absence of elite
consensual unity. 139
Where the Czech Republic succeeded in democratic principles and civil-military
relations, Slovakia has failed (i.e., intolerance of opposition parties, arrogance of
Meciar's governing style, government violations of constitutional law and repeated
distain and disrespect for the country's constitutional court, centralization of power, and
the politicization of all Slovakian social life). Jeffrey Simon's studies on civilian control
of the military in Central and Eastern Europe show that Slovakia did not meet his first




military. First, there is no clear division of authority between the president and the
government in the constitution, especially when Prime Minister Meciar assumed most of
the presidential rights and became Commander-in-Chief. Because of the Slovak
constitutional crisis (no President since March 2, 1998), it is not clear who commands
and controls the military and promotes military officers, as was evident in the nomination
of the new Slovakian's CGS, Colonel Miklus. Secondly, the post of the Minister of
Defense is held by a civilian minister, but there is no distinct government control of the
General Staff and military commanders through defense ministries. This is true because
there were no clear rights between the Minister of Defense and his state secretary. State
secretary Gajdos (HZDS), for example, controlled arms acquisition from the settlement of
the Russian Federation's debt toward Slovakia for the damage caused to Czechoslovakia
by the Soviet troops' occupying its territory from 1968 to 1992, and there was poor
coordination between them within the Ministry of Defense.
While civilian control of the military in the Czech Republic is successfully
maintained, in Slovakia, because of its political problems, it is not. Even though the
Slovak military is being successfully transformed, Slovakia needs to improve its political
system and needs to control the military effectively. Moreover, the military must not be
politicized. Where there is an attempt to do so, a consolidated democracy cannot be
established and maintained.
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IV. STATE TRANSITION TO NATO ALLIANCE
The enlargement ofNATO will strengthen security, freedom, and peace in
Europe. It will secure the gains ofdemocracy in Central Europe. }4°
- Senator Bob Dole (R-KS)
A. INTRODUCTION
The North Atlantic Treaty, the Washington Treaty, was signed in Washington,
D.C., on April 4, 1949 by twelve countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. 141 Since then, NATO has been enlarged three times to its current
membership of sixteen nations. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, Germany in
1955, and Spain in 1982. On July 8 and 9, 1997, at the Madrid Summit, following
changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1990, the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
formally invited another three countries—former Warsaw Pact nations, the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary, to become NATO members (Figure rV-1), fifteen years
after the last NATO enlargement. Since then the international order, security system, and
the world political map has changed significantly. These changes in Central and Eastern
Europe also created a new security environment among current NATO members,
14^ Bob Dole. "Enlargement Endorsing NATO Enlargement: Remarks to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council." 25
June 1996. Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/op_980219_endorse.html> [17 August 1998],
p.l.
141 Lord Ismay, "Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty," NATO: The First Five Years 1949 - 1954 (Netherlands:
Bosch-Ultrecht, 1954), p. 11.
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countries invited to join NATO, countries excluded from NATO membership (i.e.,
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia), as well as non-member
countries, such as Russia and Ukraine. Today it is extraordinarily important for those
countries excluded from full NATO membership that close cooperation and
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Figure IV-1 A Map of NATO Enlargement, 1949 to 1999
Source: "'The Admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO Will Change
the Political and Military Dynamics of Europe." The New York Times (1 May 1998), p. 1.
As NATO enlarges, it must continue to develop its plan with non-NATO
countries and must find its new role in a post-Cold War era. With no clear enemy,
NATO must avoid creating new dividing lines that could reignite security uncertainties in
Europe. NATO's new mission must encourage cooperation in addressing common
security problems. For instance, the creation of agreements, institutions, and
organizations, such as those listed below, could develop mutual relationship:
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1) Enhancing the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE);
2) Enhancing a role of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI),
3) Signing the Founding Act (an agreement on mutual relations, cooperation and
security between NATO and the Russian Federation);
4) The Partnership for Peace program (PfP);
5) Concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF);
6) The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC); and
7) The Western European Union (WEU).
This fourth chapter will mainly discuss the chronological events and the pros and
cons of NATO enlargement, as well as the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's efforts to
gain NATO membership which they see as requirements for a new "security architecture"
drawn in Central and Eastern Europe. Analyzing these needs for a new security in all of
Europe, this chapter suggests that not all of the newly-emerging democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe .have met the minimal requirements for early NATO membership.
Although most of these countries' policy priorities were clearly laid down—they wanted
to join NATO—their efforts were not always as effective as expected by the Western
democracies. For example, in 1994 and early 1995, the "hot" candidates for the first
round of NATO enlargement were the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia,
four countries of the Visegrdd Group. But several months later, Slovakia's NATO
membership was uncertain because of the country's anti-democratic practices which
resulted in Slovakia's exclusion from NATO's first round of enlargement in 1997.
The end of communism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the termination of
the Cold War, the spread of democracy in Europe, German unification, the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, and the instability in Central and Eastern Europe gave NATO and other
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security organizations, such as the OSCE, the WEU and the UN, a new opportunity to
build a new security architecture all over Europe.
B. FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO
Reintegration with the West, from which Czechoslovakia was torn in 1938 by
National Socialistic Germany and again in 1948 and in 1968 by communism was
Czechoslovakia's foreign policy priority.
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact dissolution in 1991, there was a need to
develop a new security arrangement in Europe. 142 The first attempt to address the new
security realities created by these new flourishing European democracies occurred in the
middle of 1990. Calling for a restructuring of its military forces and a reorientation of its
strategy and security policy, NATO at its July 1990 summit in London, declared that "it
no longer considered Russia an adversary and announced a new program for cooperation
open to all the former Communist states of the East." 143 Since that time, enhancing
security and stability throughout Europe and deciding not to follow the Warsaw Pact into
dissolution, NATO, called by Czech President Vaclav Havel '"a guarantor of Euro-
14
- Jeffrey Simon, ed., "NATO, Warsaw Pact, and European Security," European Security Policy after the
Revolutions of 1989 (Washington D.C.: The National Defense university Press, 1991), p. 45.
3
"United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO: Management and Enlargement." June 1995. Available
[Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/europe/chapter_2.html. [16 September 1998], p. 7.
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American civilization and thus a pillar of global security," 144 began its historical
transformation that continues today.
For example, NATO's July 1990 London Declaration by the NAC led to the
establishment of the first formal dialogue and consultation between NATO and the newly
independent countries of the former Warsaw Pact Treaty (WTO). 145 On November 28,
1990, Czechoslovakia received a status of "NATO associate delegate," and on March 21,
1991, President Vaclav Havel was the first head of the former Warsaw Pact country to
visit Brussels NATO headquarters. 146 In June 1991 in Copenhagen, declaring that "We
do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent. Our
objectives is to help create a Europe whole and free," 147 NATO took another step to meet
its challenge. In response to both, NATO's London and Copenhagen meetings, NATO,
five months later, at the Rome Summit adopted a new security Strategic Concept
committing it to a broad approach to keep new Europe free, stable, and undivided. To
institutionalize NATO's commitment to the new Europe, the November 1991 NATO
Summit in Rome created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which
established a new institutional framework for political and security cooperation between
144 John Omicinski, "NATO Expansion Expected at Summit, Could Make or Break Clinton Presidency." Gannet
News Service, 3 July 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [24 November 1998], p. 1.
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the two Western and Eastern blocs. The inaugural meeting of the NACC began on
December 20, 1991, the day of the Soviet Union's dissolved, only five months after the
disintegration of NATO's principal adversary during the Cold War, the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO). 148 The concluding meeting of the NACC took place in Sintra,
Portugal, on May 30, 1997, followed by the inaugural meeting of the Euro Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC replaced the NACC and became a new
cooperative mechanism between NATO and all NACC and PfP countries. 149
1. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON
Naturally, after the uprooting of communism in Czechoslovakia and the spread of
democratic freedom, people freely and openly expressed their feelings about the 1968
Prague Spring. The Czech and Slovak people hated to be part of a military alliance that
once invaded them and then for more than twenty years remained as a "watchdog.'" This
explain why the Czech and Slovak people did not trust any military alliance in the
beginning of 1990s and also why Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel wanted to
dissolve both military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On May 14, 1955, the
Warsaw Pact, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was founded
in Warsaw by the eight nations: Albania, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic
1 io S l \
Republic, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. The Warsaw
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Pact was formed as a counterpart to NATO several days after West Germany joined the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1990, Havel characterized the Warsaw Pact as "a
remnant of the past which came into being as a typical product of Stalinist
expansionism." 150 He declared that the Warsaw Pact had no further reasons to exist.
The issue of dissolving the Warsaw Pact became more and more discussed by the end of
1990. Commenting on the existence of the Warsaw Pact, Havel said:
Dinosaurs might be nice for museums, but they are not for our time, and
the Warsaw Pact is a dinosaur. It is hard for anyone in our country, and
not just ours, to hear the words Warsaw Pact and not think of 1968 (when
Warsaw Pact troops crushed Czechoslovakia's pro-democracy movement).
How can we as free nations want to remain a member of the Warsaw
Pact? 151
Eight months after this statement, on July 1, 1991, Vaclav Havel opened a six-
nation meeting, in Prague, that dissolved the Warsaw Pact. Contrary to all previous
meetings, which mainly focused on future activities, the Prague Warsaw Pact meeting
was the last one. Thus after the thirty-six-year existence of this military-political treaty,
the main task of the session was to sign a protocol that formally ended all Warsaw Pact
activities. Only six of eight founding nations' delegations (Albania withdrew in 1968 and
the German Democratic Republic's membership ended with the reunification of Germany
150
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in 1990) were represented by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, Bulgarian President
Zhelyu Zhelev, Polish President Lech Walesa, Romanian President Ion Diescu, Soviet
Vice-president Gennadi Yanayev and Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. The
military structure of the Warsaw Pact was ended with the signing of the Budapest
Protocol on March 31, 1991. 152
The collapse of the Soviet empire and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact greatly
disrupted the economy of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Existing economic
structures died away quite naturally. The price deregulation and abolition of the
Moscow-managed trade exchange ended the Soviet Union's control of all Warsaw Pact
countries' economies. On June 28, 1991, one month before the Warsaw Pact was
dissolved, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), founded in 1949,
disbanded. 153
2. The Visegrad Group Four
The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, with the persisting
risks and uncertainties in the Soviet Union, the Balkans and the Middle East, created a
security vacuum in the territory between the current eastern frontier of NATO and the
border of the former Soviet Union. The "Visegrad Group," sometimes called "the
Visegrad Four," former Soviet bloc countries Czechoslovakia (since 1993, the Czech
152
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Republic and Slovakia), Poland, and Hungary were first united at a meeting in Visegrad,
Hungary, in February 1991. They agreed on a joint approach to security and foreign
policy issues to integrate better into the Western European democratic civilization. 154
They were the first nations from the post-Communist countries to suggest the Warsaw
Pact's dissolution. In contrast to other regional groups that also emerged after the
Visegrad Group, such as the Central European Initiative, the Council of Baltic Sea
countries, or the Black Sea Community, and the Barents Sea Community, only the
Visegrad group "developed effective forms of political cooperation and spawn common
economic projects." 155 Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON in
1991, membership of the Washington Treaty has become the Visegrad Group's priority.
When the Visegrad Group instituted its most spectacular success, the Central European
Free Trade Zone Agreement (CEFTA), in 1993, which lowered trade barriers, the
Visegrad countries realized their greatest achievement toward democracy and a free
marker economy. 156
3. Brussels NATO Summit in 1994: Partnership for Peace (PfP)
In the framework of the NACC, the first summit meeting of the North Atlantic
Council since 1991, held in Brussels on January 10 and 1 1, 1994, provided a reason for
1 -'4 Stephen Borsody, "Central Europe and the European Union." The New Central Europe (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), pp. 294-295.
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believing that transforming NATO made a crucially important and ongoing contribution
to Europe's evolving security and defense arrangements. 157 The Brussels NATO Summit
gave real agreement to the promise in the 1991 Maastricht treaty founding the European
Union that the Western European Union would be developed as the defense component
of the EU, while at the same time being the instrument for strengthening the European
pillar of NATO.
The most important steps were taken in Brussels when NATO adopted the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) proposal, under which individual countries, mainly from the
former Warsaw Pact, including Russia, established yet stronger relationships with NATO.
The Brussels Summit also declared that NATO was open to new members in the future.
The proposal offered all former Warsaw Pact countries limited associations with NATO.
The main goals of PfP program are described below. They included:
facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and
budgeting processes;
ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject
to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority
of the UN and/or responsibility of the CSCE;
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the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for
the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to
strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in
the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian
operations, and others as many subsequently be agreed;
the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able
to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic
Alliance. 158
All four Visegrad countries were seeking an immediate security guarantee of full
membership in NATO, and the PfP program did not satisfy their efforts. However, the
Visegrad Group meeting on January 7, 1994, in Warsaw, prior to President Clinton's visit
to Prague on January 1 1 and 12, 1994, considered that the American PfP proposal was "a
step in the right direction, was conducive to the idea of mutual security and led to the
expansion of cooperation between NATO and the states of Central-Eastern Europe." 159
President Havel hosted another important meeting of Visegrad group countries,
which met with President Clinton, in Prague, on January 12, 1994. After Clinton
launched the U.S. PfP program for former Soviet bloc countries, Havel declared that:
"Yalta went down in history as a symbol of the division of Europe. I would be happy if
today the city of Prague emerged as a symbol of Europe's standing in alliance." 160
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The U.S.-sponsored PfP program brought US financial aid into the participating
states' infrastructures in their political, economic and military sectors. According to
Clinton, the PfP initiative "would reinforce the development of democratic practices such
as respect for human rights and civilian control of armed forces." 161 The proposal
certainly helps participating countries align their militaries with those in NATO, bridging
the gap of Compatibility and interoperability between armed forces in the Western
democracies and former Warsaw Pact countries. The PfP program became more
intensive in 1996 and 1997 and achieved great results in preparing new candidates for
early NATO membership.
4. Madrid NATO Summit in 1997
The fifth NATO Summit since 1989, held on July 8 and 9, 1997, was among the
most important in NATO history, because it definitely decided, after long debates and
discussions, which countries to invite to join the Alliance in 1999. The Madrid Summit
announced the climax of the NATO enlargement debate and formally invited the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary to join NATO and begin accession talks. NATO also
stated that the alliance remains open to further accessions. 162
On December 16, 1997, in an effort to continue implementing the Madrid Summit
decisions on NATO enlargement, all sixteen NATO foreign ministries signed with the
161
"North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit Held; Eastern 'Partnership' Pacts Endorsed; Other News." Facts on
File World News Digest. 13 January 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998]. p. 3.
16
~ Gebhardt von Moltke, "Accession of New Members to the Alliance: What Are the Next Steps? NATO Review, No.
4, Vol. 45, July- August 1997, pp. 4-9.
116
Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary protocols for their accession to NATO. 163 This
also ended the accession talks with these three invitee countries and it marked the
beginning of the process of ratification. 164 As of this writing, the accession protocols
have already been ratified by the Parliaments of the three invited countries and all 16
NATO countries. On December 1, 1998, the Upper chamber of the Netherlands
Parliament, the last Parliament remaining to approve NATO enlargement, signed the
accession protocols and completed the ratification process. 165 Accepting President
Clinton's invitation for the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington D.C., the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary will receive full NATO membership at the Alliance's 50
anniversary in April 1999.
C. THE US AND NATO OPINION ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
NATO's transformation very often raised questions like: "Whether NATO
enlargement is of much importance in the contemporary changing world" and if so, then,
"Should NATO be enlarged to include states in Central and Eastern Europe?" Finally,
"Will the democratic regimes that are going to replace some of the Communist and
163 Javier Solana, "On Course for a NATO of 19 Nations in 1999." NATO Review, No. 1. Vol. 46, Spring 1998, pp.
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authoritarian ones keep Europe peaceful?" In an uneasy post-Cold War era, answering
these questions is complicated.
It is very well known that Russia does not support the idea of NATO enlargement,
and that it sees that enlargement process as threatening. Contrary to the US and the other
NATO's countries, including its recent applicants, Russia sees NATO enlargement as a
step toward destabilizing security in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, with
regard to Russia and NATO, a new chapter in the post-Cold War history of Europe
opened on May 27, 1997, when President Clinton and other NATO leaders signed a
Founding Act of mutual cooperation and security between the alliance and its former
Russian adversary, represented by President Boris Yeltsin. The agreement established a
new NATO-Russia Council for Consultation on Security, and NATO assured Russia that
it had no plans to threaten it.
However, during US President Clinton's last visit in Moscow, in September 1998,
President Yeltsin again strongly expressed a negative position on NATO enlargement to
the East, saying that, "In principle, Russia refuses to solve problems by power and also
'natocentrism' as a model for European security." 166
Learning from our history, we can clearly say that a military alliance such as
NATO is the only military alliance that has been promoting security, stability, and
democracy to secure the democratic gains in Central and Eastern Europe. As many
166
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scholars and NATO supporters argue, functioning democracies across Central and
Eastern Europe will prevent another war from descending on the region because it is less
likely that democracies will fight against each other.
Why should NATO enlarge if there is not any military threat to Europe today?
Just because there is no threat to Europe similar to the ones during WWI, WWII, and the
Cold War does not mean that a threat may not exist in the future. The ethnic conflicts in
the territories of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), proved that savage ethnic strife
could exist in the heart of Europe. There are new threats in today's world, such as ethnic
conflicts, terrorist acts, nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands, drug smuggling,
and international crime.
Even though recent studies of NATO advocates predict that the enlargement of
NATO will promote democracy and enhance security in Europe, there are still a lot of
opponents of NATO enlargement, not only among Russians but also among Americans.
For example, George Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow in 1947 and an expert on
US-Soviet relations and the author of the famous "X" article, which defined the U.S.
Cold War policy of containment of the Soviet Union for more than forty years, is against
NATO enlargement, seeing it as a tragic mistake. He says:
I am strongly against the idea of expanding NATO up to the Russian
frontiers. That is the one thing I can think of that would really stir up a
truly troublesome nationalistic, military reaction in Russia. My goodness,
look at our Monroe Doctrine; every great power is sensitive about having
its immediate neighbors connected with another great military power. 167
'" George Kennan, "A Diplomat at Century's End," U.S. News & World Report, (1996), p. 41.
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He argues that NATO enlargement is the beginning of a new Cold War. 168
In May 1998, before the US Senate approved NATO enlargement, there were also
opponents of NATO enlargement among Congressmen. For example, Senator Daniel P.
Moynihan, Democrat of New York, has recently asserted that NATO enlargement will
spark a nuclear war. The Senator said: "NATO enlargement could lead the United States
to stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war with Russia." 169
However, according to recent studies, NATO enlargement will certainly promote
stability in Europe by providing a secure environment for new members for further
consolidation of democracy and open market economies. As U.S. President Clinton
stated, "NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return
to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions
for prosperity to flourish." 170 Thus, the following excerpts from Top Ten Questions on
NATO Enlargement clearly describes four logical and primary reasons for admitting the
Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO:
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1) "Enlargement will make NATO stronger and better able to
address Europe's security challenges:"
Adding the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO should give NATO a
stronger collective defense capability and reduce the possibility of another major conflict
including weapons proliferation, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism in Europe. "As NATO
enlarges, more states will share the same responsibility to bear NATO's core mission" for
safeguarding stability and security in the transatlantic area. Each time the Alliance has
enlarged, NATO has become stronger. 171
2) "Enlargement will strengthen NATO:"
Adding the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO will make the
Alliance stronger and better to carry out Europe's security missions. These three states
will add over 200,000 troops (the size of U.S. troop strength reduced in Europe after the
end of the Cold War) to NATO. (Poland has a force of 230,000, approximately the size
of the forces of the United Kingdom (228,000), and the Czech Republic and Hungary
have forces of 57,000 and 60,000, respectively, roughly the size of the armed forces of
Portugal (56,000) and Canada (64,830), 172
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3) "Enlargement will bolster stability and consolidate democracy in
Central Europe:"
Adding the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO will help the Alliance
bolster stability and promote democratic trends in Central and Eastern Europe because in
order to join NATO, candidates must a maintain functioning democracy and a market
economy. This means that perspective members will behave in a democratic fashion in
order to qualify for NATO membership.
4) "Enlarging NATO will erase Stalin's artificial dividing line [the
Iron Curtain] in Europe:" 173
While some countries were excluded from the first round of NATO enlargement
at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Alliance declared its open-door policy for those
future members who meet NATO requirements. This means that the 1999 NATO
enlargement will not be the last.
1. Minimum Requirements for Candidates for NATO Membership
It is most likely that the 1999 Washington Summit will not invite or name
another "hopeful" country in the second round of NATO membership. However, based
on Study on NATO Enlargement 174 and Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO
173 "-j-
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with its open door policy expects to invite other nations to accession negotiation in the
coming years. New candidates for NATO membership must meet some minimum
requirements. They must:
a) Uphold democracy and the rule of law, including tolerance for
diversity;
b) Progress toward an open market economic system;
c) Establish civilian constitutional control of their militaries;
d) Resolve disputes with neighbors and respect the sovereignty of other
nations peacefully;
e) Respect human rights; and
f) Develop gradually military capabilities that are congruent and
interoperable with NATO systems. 175
However, the most important criterion for invitation to NATO membership is
whether they will strengthen the Alliance and increase security and stability in all of
Europe.
D. THE CZECH REPUBLIC'S NATO INTEGRATION AFTER 1993
Ever since it came into existence, the Czech Republic has been taking convincing
steps to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In its effort, the Czech Republic
never expected to act passively in the NATO integration process. Rather, since its
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its desire to join the European Union, the Czech Republic thus intends to bring its
integration efforts to fruition. The government of the Czech Republic is convinced that
its membership in NATO will add to the stability and security of the Czech Republic and
the whole of Central Europe, and that taking advantage of transatlantic bonds will build a
new security system in Europe.
On January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic became a member of the NACC. On
March 10, 1994, the Czech Republic joined the PfP program when Prime Minister Vaclav
Klaus signed the PfP project. 176 Jaromir Novotny, Chief of the Foreign Affairs
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic (now. Deputy Minister of
Defense for Foreign Affairs), said, "by signing the PfP Framework Document ... the
Czech Republic has confirmed its interest in close cooperation with the North Atlantic
Alliance." He saw the Czech Republic participation in PfP program "as a kind of test of
maturity for the novices seeking eventual NATO membership." 177
1. Individual Dialogue between the Czech Republic and NATO
In 1996 and 1997, based on the 1995 study of NATO enlargement requiring new
members to share both the benefits and the obligations of NATO membership, NATO
conducted individual dialogues with those countries interested in close cooperation with
NATO and its membership. Those countries were, for example, Albania, Bulgaria, the
l 7^
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Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland,
Rumania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
The individual dialogue between the Czech Republic and NATO was conducted
from May 1996 to April 1997. In 1996, the Czech Republic delegation was headed by the
then First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra. Representatives of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, experts of the Ministry of the Interior and the
State Material Reserves Administration took part in all the talks as well. Mr. Gebhardt
von Moltke, NATO Deputy General Secretary for Political Affairs, led the NATO team.
The dialogue was supplemented by collective briefings, in which representatives
of the partner countries were informed about issues and problems of general interest.
Organized by the NATO International Secretariat, the briefings were held on April 18,
and May 31, 1996. There were six rounds of the individual dialogue between the Czech
Republic and NATO:
• Round 1 took place in Brussels on May 23, 1996. The main issues for discussion
were problems of political-security and military strategies of the Czech Republic, its
command structures, and the structure of its armed forces and their organization;
• Round 2 was held in Brussels on July 11, 1996, to discuss the civilian aspects of
membership, defense programs and budgets, intelligence, and intelligence safety;
• Round 3, the so-called "Round 2.5," took place in Brussels on July 31, 1996, to
discuss problems of military defense policies, the Czech Republic's experience of
crisis operations and IFOR, the structure and forces of the CR Army, economic
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development of the Czech Republic, and the benefits of the NACC, the PfP program,
and regional cooperation;
• Round 4 took place on October 25, 1996, to deal, in particular, with the defense
resources and capacity of the CR Army and state;
• Round 5 was held on April 7, 1997. Karel Kovanda, Deputy Foreign Minister,
headed the Czech Republic delegation. On the agenda were preparations for the
NATO Madrid summit meeting, the state of public opinion in the Czech Republic,
military expenditure, and the Czech Republic's relations with the Slovak Republic;
and
• Round 6 was the last round of the individual dialogue and took place in Brussels on
April 14, 1997. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, headed the Czech Republic delegation
who met with the ambassadors to NACC (at 16 plus 1 level). Prime Minister Klaus
expressed the Czech Republic's determination to join NATO and complete all its
plans and commitments. 178
2. The Czech Government Committee on Integration into NATO
At its meeting on June 25, 1997, the Government of the Czech Republic decided
to establish a Committee on Integration of the Czech Republic into NATO. The
committee is chaired by Prime Minister Klaus and includes key cabinet members and
other government officials. The committee coordinates the Czech Republic's efforts to
178 [The] Czech Republic Closes First Stage of Joining NATO." CTK National News Wire, 7 April 1997. Available
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become a NATO member. The decision to establish the committee followed the
discussion of the report on the individual dialogue between the Czech Republic and
NATO. The report identifies the key areas of activities the government will focus on in
the process of adjusting the domestic situation to NATO standards. 179
3. The Czech Republic and the NATO Madrid Summit
On July 8, 1997, the summit of NATO member countries in Madrid was one of
the most significant milestones in the history of the Czech Republic. From the Czech
Republic's point of view, the most significant result of the Madrid Summit was the
decision to invite the Czech Republic, together with Poland, and Hungary, to begin its
accession talks to the North Atlantic Treaty. During the Madrid NATO meeting, on July
8, 1997, President Havel said:
It is not by chance that, having shaken off Communism, the new
democracies of Europe are striving to become members of NATO. They
realize that membership is the best tool for a collective European defense,
and for the defense of democratic values of states under the rule of law. 180
On December 16, 1997, in response to the Madrid Summit, Foreign Minister
Jaroslav Sedivy, representing the Czech Republic, signed in the presence of the 16
Foreign Ministers of NATO member countries and Foreign Ministers of Poland, and
Hungary the protocols concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and
19 Committee for NATO Integration To Be Established - Zieleniec." CTK National News Wire. 25 June 1997.
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Hungary, to the North Atlantic Treaty. 181 Jaroslav Sedivy stated that the signing of the
protocol was an "important milestone in the Czech people's modern history." 182
4. Accession Talks between the Czech Republic and NATO
After the Brussels NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting, from September to
November 1997, there were five rounds of accession talks between the Czech Republic
and NATO. Karel Kovanda, deputy Foreign Minister, led the delegation of the Czech
Republic. All the talks were attended by representatives of the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior and Finance, and, depending on
the agenda, experts of the Office of the Czech Republic Government and State Material
Reserves Administration. The NATO team was headed by Mr. Klaus-Peter Klaiber,
Deputy NATO General Secretary for Political Affairs. The five rounds of the accession
talks were all held in Brussels:
• Round 1, on September 23, 1997, to discuss mainly political issues concerning the
Czech Republic's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty;
• Round 2, on October 6, 1997, to deal with problems of defense and military
structures and participation in collective defense;
181
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• Round 3, on October 13, 1997. On the agenda were problems of defense resources
and participation in joint budgets (civilian, military, and security investments
program);
• Round 4, on October 23, 1997. These accession talks focused on issues of security
information; and
• Round 5, on November 10, 1997. The Czech Republic delegation handed over the
"Letter of Intent" (LOI) signed by Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister of the Czech
Republic, confirming the interest of the Czech Republic to join NATO and share all
its responsibilities. The LOI also stated that the government would contribute to the
NATO joint budgets a share of 0.9 percent of the total volume of individual
budgets. 183
On January 21, 1998, the debate on NATO enlargement in the Czech Republic ended
with the government approval of the Czech Republic's accession to NATO. On April 15,
1998, the Czech government's position on NATO membership was supported by the
Czech Parliament, when 154 of 192 members voted for NATO. 184 The vote was 154 to
38. Two weeks later, on April 30, 1998, the Czech Senate voted overwhelmingly for the
Czech Republic's entrance into NATO. The vote was sixty-four to three, far more than
183
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the two-thirds majority needed to approve the resolution. 185 It was on that same day,
April 30, 1998, when the US Senate voted to expand the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization by 80 to 19 votes. The US became the fifth of sixteen existing NATO
members that approved the NATO ratification document. 186
Since the independence of the Czech Republic, all government coalition parties have
been in favor of NATO membership. The Social Democrats advocated having the NATO
referendum as a tool for achieving NATO membership, but after the June 1998
Parliamentary elections, Zeman's cabinet finally decided not to have a national
referendum on the Czech Republic's entrance into NATO. Since the spring of 1998, the
number of determined NATO opponents has decreased, and in September 1998,
according to the Empirical Research Center {STEM), about sixty percent of the Czech
population would vote for the Czech Republic's accession into NATO. 187
5. The Czech Republic View on NATO Enlargement
For Czechs, Poles and Hungarians, NATO membership does not mean solely a
safeguarding of democracy and a guarantee of security in the new post-Cold War era, but
also ensures national sovereignty. As So'nia Winter, correspondent for Radio Free
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Europe, wrote, for the three invitee countries, "NATO membership will mean emotional
fulfillment of a long-repressed 'sense of belonging' to [Western] Europe." 188
The Czech Republic's four primary reasons for joining NATO are historical,
international-political, military, and economic. According to the Czech Ambassador to
the US, Alexander Vondra, who was formerly the Czech Republic's First Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs, "the Czech Republic believes [NATO] should be enlarged because, in
the past:
a) "NATO has justified itself as an organization that can guarantee
transatlantic bonds;
b) "NATO does not and never shall lose its purpose (despite the current absence
of a clearly defined enemy);
c) "NATO protects only its members from external threat;
d) "The Czech people want to share in the responsibility for safeguarding
stability and security in the transatlantic area;
e) "We advocate the same values and are willing to defend them;
f) "We are convinced that it is more effective and cheaper to guarantee security
in cooperation with others;
g) "Having learned a lesson from the history, we regard the stabilization of
Central Europe as the task of our time, and as precondition for stability in all
of Europe." 189
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E. SLOVAKIA'S NATO INTEGRATION AFTER 1993
The transformation of Slovakia into the Euro-Atlantic organization started when
Slovakia became an independent state in 1993. 190 Although Vladimir Meciar's cabinet in
its government program in 1994 declared interest in Slovakia's entry into NATO,
HZDS's coalition partner, the Slovak National Party's (SNS) communique contains the
idea of Slovak neutrality. On August 10, 1998, in his interview for the Czech daily
Prdvo, Jan Slota, chairman of the SNS, said:
We do not want to enter some military pacts.... We have learnt from our
history that military alliance neither with the West nor with the East has
been worthwhile. The British and French threw us out to Hitler in 1939...
and after the Second World War II we became slaves of the Eastern
powers which itself, for a change, occupied us for twenty years. 191
However, since Slovakia became a signatory of Partnership for Peace program
(the seventh country of the Central and Eastern country to sign the PfP framework
document), it has been very active in meeting its goals to fulfill successfully, in
cooperation with all members of NATO and PfP, the necessary requirements for full
NATO membership. After the signing ceremony on. February 9, 1994, at NATO
headquarters in Brussels, during a news conference, Meciar stated:
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This offers an opportunity to gradually develop a transeuropean security
system based on cooperation and on gradual integration.... This program
is one that guarantees security and the opportunity for peace for everybody
and creates a space to prevent Europe splitting into two. 192
One month later, on March 16, 1998, after the Meciar government fell as a result
of a no-confidence vote in the Slovak Parliament, President Kovac named the new
government of Jozef Moravcik, which immediately "initiated significant changes in
Slovakia's defense and security policy." This included establishing democratic civilian
control of the military when naming the first civilian Minister of Defense, Pavol Kanis,
adapting the organizational structure of Slovak military forces and revising the Defense
Doctrine of Slovakia. 193
1. Slovakia's Individual Dialogue with NATO
On March 18, 1996, Slovakia, the first country from the Central and Eastern
European countries, submitted to the NATO headquarters in Brussels a document which
formally begins its individual dialogue with NATO concerning security issues in Central
Europe and future membership in that political and military organization. 194
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Like the Czech Republic, Slovakia conducted six individual dialogues with
NATO in 1996 and 1997:
• Round 1 took place in Brussels on May 3, 1996. The main goal for discussion
was NATO enlargement and its impact on the regional politico-security
situation in the new European Security System;
• Round 2 was held in Brussels on June 25, 1996, to discuss the civilian and
military aspects of membership, such as civilian democratic control of the
military, military standardization, and legislation on military deployment
outside its borders;
• Round 3 took place in Brussels on October 16, 1996. On the agenda were
issues of nuclear policy, the NATO enlargement process and the issue of
economic development in Slovakia;
• Rounds 4 and 5 were held in Brussels on April 10, 1997. These individual
dialogues focused on issues of Slovakia's privatization, national minorities,
the Slovak-Hungarian relationship, and Slovak democratic institutions; and
• Round 6 was the last round of individual dialogue before the NATO Madrid
Summit. This round took place in Brussels on April 17, 1997, and on the
agenda were issues dealing with the NATO enlargement and preparations for
decisions in Madrid. 195
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2. Slovakia and the NATO Madrid Summit
After years of political instability and intrigues and the failure of the referendum
on NATO membership, in 1997, that was invalidated because of government interference
in the balloting, Slovakia has sent a negative signal to NATO and the EU countries and
Slovakia's case for early membership was weakened. This led to a verdict of Slovakia's
exclusion from the first wave of NATO enlargement declared by the 1997 NATO Madrid
Summit.
While Romania and Slovenia were mentioned as other possibilities, Slovakia was
not discussed "anywhere in the document. As one of the Visegrad Four . . . invited to join
NATO, Slovakia was once regarded as a strong candidate for NATO membership." 196
Ambassador Johnson openly blamed Slovakia's denial of membership on activities taken
by Vladimir Meciar's government.
When Slovakia was excluded from the first wave of NATO enlargement in the
NATO Madrid Summit on July, 8, 1998, former Slovak President Michal Kovac said,
I don't view [the exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of EU and
NATO expansion] as a rejection of Slovakia.... What was rejected was
the policy of the current Slovak government, especially those policies
having to do with. . . implementing democratic principles. . .. Slovakia still
has a chance.... But not with Meciar and not with Meciar's policy. 197
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Indeed, NATO sent a clear signal (minimal requirements) for those countries
interested in NATO membership that: the real factors governing enlargement are mainly
political (not the military compatibility of weapons), a stable democratic system, good
relations with neighbors, democratic civilian control of the military, guaranteed human
rights, and a state market economy. 198 While the Czech Republic meets all of these
requirements, Slovakia appears to be lacking in most of those areas. Slovakia did not
fulfill the NATO criteria in the political and social field.
However, after Meciar's defeat, Slovakia's isolation ended. According to Jan
Kavan, the Czech Foreign Minister, "Slovakia would now be welcome to join the Czechs,
Poles and Hungarians in the Visegrad Group, which co-ordinates their applications to join
NATO and the EU. 199
F. WHY THE CZECH REPUBLIC WAS INVITED TO JOIN THE
ALLIANCE
As I already discussed, regarding US and NATO opinions on NATO enlargement
and the minimal requirements for NATO's applicants, the Czech Republic will certainly
contribute to the security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe.
198
"Survey of Slovak Press." CTK National News Wire, 2 May 1996. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS
[19 November 1998], p. 2.
199 Martin Walker, "Czechs Welcome New Slovakia." The Guardian, 30 September 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]:
EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.
136
By admitting new members NATO will make itself better able to address
Europe's new security challenges. Enlargement will foster democratic
reforms and stability, strengthen NATO's capacity for collective defense,
promote regional harmony, spread NATO's burdens more broadly, help
avoid a destabilizing zone of insecurity and instability in Europe and
create a better Central and East European climate for market growth and
prosperity.200
According to Dr. Franklin D. Kramer, assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs:
The Czech Republic has served as a political role model for Central and
Eastern Europe. It has made great progress in establishing broad
democratic control over its armed forces; it is fully dedicated to a free,
open market economy and since 1989 it has been a fully functioning
democracy. The Czech Republic has also cultivated close ties with all its
neighbors... and the Czechs have no conflicts with neighboring countries
relating to minority ethnic groups. Since the Madrid Summit, Prague has
also increased its trilateral regional defense cooperation with Warsaw and
Budapest.... Bilaterally, the Czechs have also contributed to the security
of Central Europe by resolving historical disputes and developing close
ties with Germany. 201
In sum, during his visit to the Czech city of Hradec Kralove, on April 16, 1998,
Alexander Vershbow, the American Ambassador to NATO, speaking about Czech
membership in NATO stated:
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The United States supported membership for the Czech Republic in
NATO because the Czech Republic was ready and committed to assume
the associated rights and responsibilities of membership in the Alliance.202
By admitting the Czech Republic and other new members, NATO will become
better able to deal with all potential security uncertainties and with today's threats to all
its members and beyond. Then, by enlarging with the Czech Republic, Poland, and
Hungary, NATO will better contribute to the security of Central Europe.
G. CONCLUSION
Four years ago, when Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech and Slovak
republics, Slovakia was among the four front-runners to be part of NATO's first round of
enlargement. But Slovakia was dropped from the enlargement process because of Slovak
Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's on-going political failure to move his country down
the path toward democracy.
The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, answering a journalist question
why Slovakia was excluded from NATO membership, stated, that the reason why the
Slovak Republic was not among the first countries to be invited to join NATO in the first
round is that Slovakia did not meet NATO's membership criteria. She said:
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It had not met a number of the criteria. . . and among those are a
functioning market system, a functioning democracy, the control of the
civilian over the military, and. . . the determination was made that at this
time, Slovakia was not [qualified]. 203
203
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If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West. If
principles of democracy win in the East, the peace and stability of all
Europe will be ensured. 204 — Vaclav Havel
Despite a long ensured tradition of the Czech lands and Slovakia being a part of
western European culture, more than forty years of Communist rule under the influence
of the Soviet Union substantially changed not only the character of the Czech and Slovak
nations but also the access of the West to both countries, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia.
Since 1993, Slovakia has differed from its neighbors and other former post-
Communist countries in Central and European Europe in many negative aspects.
Foremost on Slovakia's list of negatives was Meciar's four-year leadership with several
politico-economic scandals, as well as machination with the constitution, and unethicaL
control over the media, intelligence services, and other bureaucracies. Also, in Slovakia
the opposition parties, coalitions, and movements were ostracized from political life into
the role of outsider. In addition, Meciar's government failed to investigate the
kidnapping of former president Michal Kovac's son. The kidnappers were given amnesty
by Meciar immediately after he took over most of the presidential rights in March 1998,
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when Kovac's presidential term expired. Another highly negative aspect of this
leadership was the unconstitutional manipulation of the May 1997 referendum on NATO
and on direct presidential elections. Finally, there also was the exclusion of
Parliamentary deputy Frantisek Gaulieder from the Parliament in 1996.
Although the Western democracies criticized Meciar's government for its failures
from the very beginning, the frustrated referendum on NATO membership and direct
presidential elections in May 1997 was considered a turning point in the anti-democratic
development in Slovakia and will never be erased from Slovakia's history. Unlike the
Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, Slovakia was not invited to join NATO in the first
round of its enlargement in the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit, and it has also failed to be
included in the first group of six countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary,
Slovenia, and Cyprus, which were invited for accession talks on entry into the European
Union. Also it failed to become a member of the OECD. Instead of reorganizing his
leadership, Meciar and his cabinet blamed the minority opposition for these failures as
well as for double standards implemented by NATO and the EU on Slovakia and its
neighbors.
Slovakia under Meciar's authoritarian leadership from 1990-91, 1992-94 and from
1994-98 was driven from democratic Europe into international isolation and a dictatorial
regime under the one party rule of the HZDS.
In voting for a new Slovak Parliament in September 1998, a majority of Slovaks
registered their disapproval of those dangerous antidemocratic trends and gave their
backing to the SDK coalition of pro-Western and democracy parties. Slovakia's isolation
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from the western communities would create different levels of security that could reignite
tension between Slovakia and neighboring Hungary and the Czech Republic and decrease
Slovakia's economic potential. In May 1997, before the Madrid Summit, France's
ambassador in Bratislava stated that, "If you isolate Slovakia, you will encourage the
most nationalist forces.... Excluding Slovakia from NATO will just help the
undemocratic trends."205 Isolated Slovakia would not be able to participate in all-
important NATO and EU meetings focusing on significant changes of its member's
militaries, politics and economics, which would have a fundamental impact in the entire
region.
The beginning of its negotiations which NATO and the EU will depend on
Slovakia's ability to remove from its political and economic life the impact of Meciarism
and Meciar's heritage. Slovakia's new government is confident that the immense
international relief at former Prime Minister Meciar's departure will help eliminate
Slovakia's isolation and return the country to the intensive process of NATO, EU, and
OECD integration.
The composition of the Dzurinda cabinet itself answered one of NATO's and the
EU's primary reservations about Slovakia's path to democracy—insufficient protection of
the rights of ethnic minorities. The Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), representing a
Hungarian minority of more than 600,000 is a partner of the new government, whose
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representatives hold the newly-created deputy prime minister's post for minority rights.
All four coalition parties have pledged to pass a law on minority languages and minority
media quickly. However the main task for Dzurinda's government in the upcoming years
is to make sure that the anti-Meciar alliance, the Slovak Democratic Coalition, stays
united.
Even though no time table has been set for a further NATO enlargement, Slovakia
now has a good chance of catching up with its neighboring countries, the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary, in being admitted to NATO and the EU. Certainly, Slovakia's
further isolation and the country's exclusion from the next group of applicants for NATO
and EU enlargement could have brought several negative consequences, such as a
worsening of Slovakia's international position, foreign policy and economic orientation to
the East (thereby losing opportunities for rapid economic and social development in
cooperation with Western nations), and an increased Russian impact on Slovakia's
development.
However, after the radical changes on Slovakia's post-election scene, the
country's political situation still remains far from clear. Unless the new Slovak
government, headed by Mikulas Dzurinda, can effect a smooth transition of centralized
power to a healthy competitive one and prove that Slovakia has a functioning democracy,
integration into Western European structures, especially Slovakia's entrance into NATO
and the EU, may not happen.
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A. WHAT SLOVAKIA SHOULD DO TO JOIN NATO AND THE EU
First of all, Slovakia must show its long-term-commitment to the principles of a
stable and rooted democracy. Even though the cabinet of Prime Minister Vladimir
Meciar has stated that the membership in NATO and the EU is Slovakia's top foreign
policy priority, they chose the wrong path to NATO and the EU. This cannot be corrected
with only several months of radical changes. However, a correction can happen after
several years of intensive political, social, and economic reforms.
Slovakia's military preparedness was judged to have been among the best of the
candidates and is not considered an obstacle to NATO membership. For instance,
Terence Taylor, assistance director of London's International Institute for Strategic
Studies, said:
Slovakia is as well-prepared as any of the other countries.... But that's not
the point that will prevent NATO expansion. There's not actually a set of
military criteria, only political criteria.206
Slovak politicians caused Slovakia's exclusion from all Euro-Atlantic
organizations.207 However, the image of Slovakia's politics has changed. The 1998
September Parliamentary elections have changed Slovakia rapidly and the new Slovak
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prospects of integration to NATO and the EU. Today, Slovakia's return to the integration
process depends purely on concrete political changes.
The main issues for Slovakia are discussed below. The biggest problem of Slovak
politics—the establishment of a new democratic Slovak government—seems to be
already solved, but there are many other problems concerning Slovak politics that still
have to be addressed before Slovakia integrates with the Western democracies:
1) Slovaks must elect a head of the state to avoid constitutional crisis:
There were concerns about the long-term tensions existing between the
government and the president exemplified in the extreme personal antagonism between
Prime Minister Meciar and President Kovac that has poisoned the political atmosphere in
Slovakia for the past four years. When President Kovac 's term expired on March 2,
1998, Slovakia plunged into a constitutional crisis. By electing a new Slovak president,
Slovakia can easily avoid possible constitutional crises.
The Coalition party agreed on a joint candidate for president, Rudolf Schuster,
mayor of Kosice and founder of the SOP, to be elected under current Parliamentary rules.
However, based on the Dzurinda's government decision, the presidential election is to be
direct. At least two candidates, Rudolf Schuster and former President of Slovakia Michal
Kovac, will run for election to the vacant presidential post. 208 Former Prime Minister
Meciar decided not to run for this post.
208
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2) Any violation of the law and constitution must be investigated and the
guilty brought to justice:
The Slovak Constitutional Court has repeatedly ruled in favor of the opposition in
politically delicate affairs, such as the abduction of former President Michal Kovac's son
to Austria, and the exclusion of Frantisek Gaulieder, a former member of the HZDS.
This relates also to all the political crimes related to the kidnapping of President Michal
Kovac's son, as well as to the murder of Robert Remias, allegedly at the hands of the
Slovak intelligence service (SIS), regardless of the Meciar amnesty. Only when all of
these violations of the law and constitution are prosecuted, will the Slovaks once again
trust in its governmental administrative bodies.
3) Effective Parliamentary control over the secret service, the SIS, must be
reestablished and SIS must be subordinated to the Ministry of Interior:
There was inadequate control of the secret services by the civilian authorities.
The Parliamentary security committee must receive regular information about SIS
activities to avoid the misuse of the secret service politically.
4) Complete the establishment of effective democratic civilian control of the
military and do not allow the civilian leadership to politicize the military:
The Slovak government must keep an apolitical military to avoid any attempts to
use the military to gain political goals.
147
5) Insufficient protection of ethnic minorities must be corrected, and a new
law on minority language must be passed:
The new government must take appropriate steps to restore all ethnic groups' trust
in governmental institutions. These institutions must serve primarily in favor of all
Slovaks citizens to protect their rights.
6) A new law on Parliamentary elections as well as a law on state-owned
media must be passed:
A new law on freedom of the press and Parliamentary election must be approved.
This is one of the most important factors determining whether a state democracy is
consolidated or not.
7) Reestablish a dialog with the democratic West, the United States, and
members of the European Union:
Slovakia must escape Meciar's foreign isolation and its negative reputation among
Western democracies. With intensive individual dialogues with Western institutions like
NATO, the EU, the WEU, the OSCE, and the UN, Slovakia will improve its image and
better prepare for another wave of NATO enlargement.
8) Review the Slovak-Russia agreements and improve the current foreign
policy and diplomacy:
First of all, Slovakia must rationally review its previous agreement with those
powers that do not want to see it fully integrated with the West. For example, according
to the daily newspaper SME, Slovakia confirmed it would revise all its agreements with
Russia. As some Slovak officials noted, some of these agreements could be an obstacle
to Slovak membership in NATO. In 1996, former Russia Ambassador to Slovakia, S.
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Jastrzembskij, stated that for the last forty months, "our countries agreed on more than 70
inter-departmental agreements."209
9) Reestablish a good relationship with neighboring countries:
Slovakia as a small country of only five million people is dependent on good
relations with its neighboring country. In 1997, after its permanently tense relations with
its southern neighbor, Hungary, Slovakia started to spoil its good relations with its
western neighbor, the Czech Republic. Reestablishing a good relationship with its
neighbors, Slovakia, in its effort to join NATO and the EU. needs a closer relationship
with at least one strong regional partner. In November 1998, Slovak Prime Minister
Dzurinda, after his first visit in Brussels, went to Poland and declared that Poland is a
strategic partner of his country. 210
10) Intensively cooperate with the Visegrad Group:
Radical changes in Slovakia's political scene which came immediately after the
1998 September Parliamentary elections, led Czech President Vaclav Havel to call for a
1999 Spring Visegrad Group Summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, to support Slovakia's effort
in NATO and the EU integration. This idea was also supported by two other Visegrad
Group's members. During Vaclav Havel's visit to Slovakia on November 7, 1998, Slovak
Prime Minister Dzurinda stated, "The regional table which is trying to integrate into
209
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western structure has four legs [i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech
Republic] and Mister President did not forget it."21 '
11) Show that Slovakia is not looking for NATO membership only because
of its benefits but that it wants to contribute to the security in the
Central and Eastern European region:
Slovakia has to demonstrate that over the long term it will undoubtedly contribute
to the security of Central and Eastern Europe and meet all its commitments for NATO
enlargement. •
12) Intensify the individual negotiations and cooperation with NATO:
Slovakia must continue to participate in the Partnership for Peace program and
Joint Combined Exercises with NATO countries, as well as enhance cooperation with the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the OSCE, and the WEU. The first step has
already been taken when the Alliance invited Slovakia to intensive the individual
dialogue with Brussels.212
13) Recovery and stabilization of the market economy;
Continuing privatization of state companies and banks must be transparent.
Foreign debt more than doubled during the Meciar period through a costly economic
policy of heavy foreign loans with enormously high interest rates. "Slovakia will need
- 1
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over 100 billion [Slovak crowns] Sk [$2.9 million] a year in direct foreign investment to
revitalize the deteriorated economy." According to the weekly. The Prague Post,
"Slovakia's foreign indebtedness through the end of June totaled $1 1.3 billion."213
Having given some of these above mention recommendations and reform
proposals, we can observe recently that Slovakia has taken some steps to repair its
reputation. As the new government declared, it seems that Slovakia led by the new Prime
Minister Dzurinda has really speeded up its effort to catch up with its Visegrad Group
partners. According to the Slovak government's program, Slovakia's priority goals are to
gain OECD membership, integration into the first wave of the European Union, and
membership in NATO. Dzurinda, began by reestablishing basic democratic principles
and started to look at internal political problems. On November 10, 1998, after he
returned to Slovakia from his first international visit to meet high NATO and EU officials
in Brussels, on November 6 and 7, 1998, Mikulas Dzurinda spoke to the members of the
Slovak National Council declaring that though Slovakia would probably miss the first
wave of NATO and EU enlargement, it had not lost support for later integration. He
stated that:
213 Ron Orol, "Investing Debt Out of Slovakia." 7 October 1998. Available [Online]:
<http://www.praguepost.cz/busil00798c.html> [10 August 1998], p. 1.
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The hands of the clock cannot be turned back—for instance, back to
November 1994. That is why we cannot wonder how our neighbors,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic which stood on the same
starting line with us, got so far ahead of us in the NATO integration.
However, Slovakia, in its effort in NATO integration, received full support
from the Alliance. Our partners are prepared to cooperate with us.... The
main steps have to be made here, at home, in our country, by us. This
means to restore a spirit of democracy, government of law, to reform a
distorted... economy, to make our administration more effective, to pass
good laws. This is a role for all of us. Because I do not know any other
way for our country to enter the area of peace, stability and prosperity of
the European unity. 214
On November 27, 1998, after his second meeting with NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana and a meeting with the NATO Council of ambassadors, Mikulas Dzurinda,
the new Prime Minister of Slovakia, said in Brussels,
I am aware that we cannot expect an early invitation, not at the summit in
Washington, but we will knock strongly on NATO's door afterwards....
Slovakia would prove in the forthcoming three or four months that it has a
stable and entirely democratic government.... Slovakia would be
interested in an early admission, even individual, and.... Slovakia would
like to join the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in this because the
four countries launched their NATO bid together in 199 1.215
These are some of the challenges which Slovakia must master. Whether Slovakia
succeeds in achieving these goals mainly depends on the stability and unity of Dzurinda'
s
214
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cabinet. Any problems, even small ones, inside the government coalition, could return
Slovakia to the Meciar's epoch.
Slovakia must continue in its reforms in order to stay on the path of integration
and reconciliation. The countries of NATO and the European Union countries, that
believe in Slovakia's effort to enter the Euro-Atlantic integration, should be asked to help
Slovakia realize its goals. With a deepened cooperation and intensive political individual
dialogue through an enhanced Partnership for Peace program and Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, Slovakia would once again be a candidate for a future wave of
NATO enlargement. "Having Slovakia together with the three Visegrad Group countries
would make Central Europe more secure, safer, and more stable. To make Central
Europe stable, safe, and prosperous means that all of its members must meet these
objectives. This will be a challenge for the twenty-first century.
Yet if Slovakia is unable to catch up with the Czech Republic and the other two
countries of the Visegrad group in the process of the first wave of NATO and the EU
integration, it should not be forgotten and relegated as an outsider country. Slovakia
should use its collected experiences to push itself ahead of the other nations which are
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